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WALKING THE TIGHT ROPE AND NOT THE PLANK: A
PROPOSED STANDARD FOR SECOND-LEVEL APPELLATE
REVIEW OF EQUITABLE MOOTNESS DETERMINATIONS
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you operate a business forced into bankruptcy. You spend months
struggling to keep your business afloat as you negotiate the bankruptcy
process, all to craft a plan that could both satisfy enough of your creditors and
convince a bankruptcy judge that it would return your business to an
economically viable state. Over the objections of a few, standoffish parties—a
few minor creditors, perhaps, or the former equity holders—the judge confirms
the plan. Even as the dejected parties appeal, the judge allows you to begin the
process of your economic rebirth. By the time your case is heard by the firstlevel appellate court,1 you have achieved most of what the plan required. The
court, weighing equitable concerns and invoking the doctrine of equitable
mootness, refuses to entertain the appeal because doing so would upset the
reorganization plan. Still unsatisfied, the parties appeal even further to the
court of appeals. Now an additional issue arises: how will that court review the
lower court’s determination that the appeal of one or more claims is moot?
Reviewing the determination without any deference whatsoever could result in
the reversal of hundreds of complex and tricky financial transactions,
potentially wrecking the debtor’s reorganization. Yet if the court grants too
much deference, it all but denies the appellant her right to a meaningful appeal.
During the widespread economic chaos of the past few years, the United
States has become intimately familiar with bankruptcy.2 Businesses have not
been spared these pressures and, like the rest of the nation, have filed dutifully

1 Throughout this Comment, “first-level appellate court” refers to either a district court or bankruptcy
appellate panel, and “second-level appellate court” refers to a circuit court of appeals.
2 There were over 1.4 million bankruptcy cases filed in 2009, representing an uptick of 11.1% from
2000 and a 34.5% increase from 2008. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 1 (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.
Ninetythree of the ninety-four districts reported increases in the number of filings. Id. at 3. These numbers also
represent the highest number of filings since the benchmark year of 2005, when the masses rushed to file
before the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) took effect. Id. at
19.
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into bankruptcy courts.3 Although most of these businesses liquidated,4 many
sought shelter in chapter 11 to prevent their businesses from folding.5 The
flexible structure of chapter 11 reorganizations allows the corporate debtor to
reform its financial affairs to preserve the inherent value of the business for the
benefit of all parties involved.6 However, there are many pressures that
encourage the debtor to exit bankruptcy as soon as possible. For instance,
many debtors require funding to survive. In the short run, the debtor needs this
capital immediately to continue normal business operations while navigating
the bankruptcy process.7 In the long run, the funding necessary to survive
outside of bankruptcy may be contingent on plan confirmation.8 Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code (Code) attempts to balance the interests of involved
parties by favoring speedy and final resolution to aid the debtor to quickly
reemerge as a viable entity.9 On occasion, however, a focus on quick
resolutions in bankruptcy reorganizations can run counter to other important
judicial concerns inherent in federal appellate proceedings.10

3 Chapter 11 filings increased from 8,785 in 2008 to 14,745 in 2009, a 68% jump. Id. at 22. 13,439 of
the chapter 11 cases filed in 2009 were business filings. Id. at 291 tbl.F-2. Eighty districts reported increases in
the number of chapter 11 filings. Id. at 22.
4 In 2009 alone, there were 40,225 business bankruptcy filings under chapter 7, nearly three times the
number of chapter 11 business filings. Id. at 291 tbl.F-2.
5 For example, Borders Group Inc. initially filed for protection under chapter 11 with the intent to
reorganize. See Joseph Checkler & Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Bookseller Borders Begins a New Chapter . . . 11,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2011, at B1. However, such attempts ultimately failed, and Borders was forced to begin
the liquidation process in July 2011. Mike Spector & Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, Borders Forced to Liquidate,
Close All Stores, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2011, at B1.
6 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179; see also Richard M.
Cieri, Scott J. Davido & Heather Lennox, Applying an Ax When a Scalpel Will Do: The Role of Exclusivity in
Chapter 11 Reform, 2 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 397, 401 (1993) (“The overriding purpose of [c]hapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code is to provide a troubled business the chance to catch its financial breath, propose a plan
to reorganize and to thereby allow it an opportunity to cure its financial ills and continue in business.”
(footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7 See Melanie Cohen, Chicago Deep-Dish Pizza Chain Giordano’s Enters Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J.
BANKR. BEAT (Feb. 17, 2011, 5:08 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/2011/02/17/chicago-deep-dishpizza-chain-giordanos-enters-bankruptcy (“In court papers, Giordano’s said it has ‘an urgent and immediate
need for cash to continue to operate.’”).
8 See, e.g., Retired Pilots Ass’n of US Airways, Inc. v. US Airways Grp., Inc. (In re US Airways Grp.,
Inc.), 369 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 2004) (allowing the corporate debtor to receive $1.24 billion upon emerging
from chapter 11 because it met its financial projections).
9 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 220–22.
10 See Lindsey Freeman, Comment, BAPCPA and Bankruptcy Direct Appeals: The Impact of Procedural
Uncertainty on Predictable Precedent, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 543, 546 (2010) (“[T]he problems direct appeals
create highlight a tension inherent in bankruptcy law: the need to balance practical considerations such as
speed, efficiency, and specialized review, with constitutional values, including fairness, due process, and the
right to an appeal.”).
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To address the proper balance for these competing interests, appellate
courts fashioned the doctrine of equitable mootness. This judicially crafted
doctrine allows a court to avoid determining an appeal on its merits when
doing so would inequitably burden the interests of third parties or interfere
with the debtor’s chances of reorganization.11 Although the concept arose soon
after the Code’s enactment in 1978,12 interest in equitable mootness has
renewed during the recent economic crisis in the courtroom13 as well as in
scholarship.14 However, one question that continues to divide circuits is the
appropriate standard of review applied to a district court’s or bankruptcy
appellate panel’s determination that an appealed claim is equitably moot.15
The rather cursory treatment of this issue by most courts16 is at odds with
the issue’s complexity and importance. A first-level appellate court’s legal and
factual judgments in bankruptcy are generally reviewed without deference
because it is not the first court to review the underlying case.17 However, the
normal state of affairs is complicated by the fact that the first-level appellate

11 See, e.g., Alta. Energy Partners v. Blast Energy Servs., Inc. (In re Blast Energy Servs., Inc.), 593 F.3d
418, 424 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Equitable mootness authorizes an appellate court to decline review of an otherwise
viable appeal of a [c]hapter 11 reorganization plan, but only when the reorganization has progressed too far for
the requested relief practicably to be granted.”).
12 See Lenard Parkins et al., Equitable Mootness: Will Surgery Kill the Patient?, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Sept. 2010, at 40, 40.
13 See, e.g., In re Blast Energy Servs., Inc., 593 F.3d at 424–26; B & M Inv., LLC. v. Calise (In re
Calise), 354 F. App’x 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009); Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327,
1337–48 (10th Cir. 2009); Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac.
Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 240–43 (5th Cir. 2009); Wooley v. Faulkner (In re SI Restructuring, Inc.), 542
F.3d 131, 135–37 (5th Cir. 2008); Liquidity Solutions, Inc. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (In re Winn-Dixie Store,
Inc.), 286 F. App’x 619, 623–24 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Curreys of Neb., Inc. v. United Producers, Inc.
(In re United Producers, Inc.), 526 F.3d 942, 947–51 (6th Cir. 2008).
14 See generally Ryan M. Murphy, Equitable Mootness Should Be Used as a Scalpel Rather than an Axe
in Bankruptcy Appeals, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRACT. 33 (2010); Parkins et al., supra note 12; Freeman,
supra note 10; Katelyn Knight, Comment, Equitable Mootness in Bankruptcy Appeals, 49 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 253 (2009); Caroline L. Rosiek, Note, Making Equitable Mootness Equal: The Need for a Uniform
Approach to Appeals in the Context of Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 685 (2007).
15 Compare In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1334–36 (reviewing equitable mootness for an abuse of discretion),
with United States ex rel. FCC v. GWI PCS 1 Inc. (In re GWI PCS 1 Inc.), 230 F.3d 788, 799–800 (5th Cir.
2000) (reviewing equitable mootness de novo).
16 See, e.g., In re GWI PCS 1 Inc., 230 F.3d at 799–800 (addressing the issue in half a page).
17 See, e.g., In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 568 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“[T]here is an unbroken and well-established line of authority from this court holding that ‘[b]ecause the
district court sits as an appellate court in bankruptcy cases, our review of the district court’s decision is
plenary.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Precision Steel Shearing, Inc. v. Fremont Fin. Corp. (In re
Visual Indus., Inc.), 57 F.3d 321, 324 (3d Cir. 1995))).
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court is the first possible body to determine the issue of equitable mootness,18
and doctrines grounded on equity or prudence are generally reviewed with
some deference.19 Furthermore, standards of review are important. Because
they can be outcome determinative,20 standards of review both inform the
potential appellant of how strong its case must be to be successful on appeal
and allow parties to articulate their arguments appropriately.21
Addressing this issue, this Comment recommends a middle course. It
proposes that, for doctrinal and practical reasons, determinations of equitable
mootness should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. However, numerous
scholars have recognized that the deference granted under the abuse of
discretion standard is more of a spectrum than a single, easily definable
standard.22 Therefore, this Comment also suggests that courts of appeals
should be more willing to overturn determinations of equitable mootness than
other issues reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
This Comment will first trace the path of a second-level appellate review of
a typical equitable mootness case from the bankruptcy court to the court of
appeals in Part I. Next, Part II will discuss the Tenth Circuit’s adoption of the
abuse of discretion standard in Search Market Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re
Paige) for the review of first-level appellate equitable mootness
determinations. Part II will also describe how the various circuits have (or have
not) addressed the issue. Part III will then address the heart of the issue: when
and how much deference should be accorded to a lower court’s determination
of equitable mootness. This Comment will also define a theoretical framework
through Supreme Court precedent and scholarship in Part III. Next, this
Comment will demonstrate why an equitable mootness determination should
be reviewed for an abuse of discretion in Part IV. Finally, this Comment will
18

See In re United Producers, Inc., 526 F.3d at 953 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that equitable
mootness is “the only [doctrine this judge knew of] where the intermediate court will be deciding an equitable
issue for the first time and is the proper body to decide that issue for the first time”).
19 See 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW § 4.16, at 4134 (4th ed. 2010).
20 See, e.g., Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.,
concurring) (continuing to disagree fundamentally with the equitable mootness doctrine, but affirming the
lower court’s judgment since the lower court “did not commit an abuse of discretion”).
21 See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 233, 241–42, 255 (2009).
22 See Henry J. Friendly, Lecture, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 762–67 (1982);
Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech: Discretion and Rights, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 213–18; Maurice
Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 650–53
(1971).
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address the policy and doctrinal reasons why a court should more thoroughly
question a lower court’s finding of equitable mootness and offer suggestions to
aid the application of this standard in Parts V and VI, respectively.
I. THE PATH FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURT TO REVIEW BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS
A. Confirmation of the Plan—An Overview
Although courts have not limited equitable mootness solely to
reorganization plans or even bankruptcy appeals,23 the doctrine developed
primarily in the context of chapter 11 reorganization plans.24 Given its origins
and continued preeminence there, this Comment limits its discussion on preappellate activity to the formation and confirmation of chapter 11 plans.
1. Proposing, Voting, and Confirming a Viable Plan—§§ 1121–1129
All chapter 11 plans follow generally defined structures within the Code.
Section 1123(a) outlines the required elements for a plan to be confirmed.25
Many of these requirements focus on how claims or interests will be treated by
the plan.26 Importantly for present purposes, a plan proponent must define
“classes” of claims and groups of interests which can only contain claims or
interests that are “substantially similar” to one another.27 Additionally, the plan
must spell out which classes of claims or interests are impaired or
unimpaired,28 and the actions that will be taken to implement the plan.29

23 See Dennis J. Connolly & Sage M. Sigler, Section 363 Revisited: The Limitations on “Free and
Clear” Sales, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, Nov. 2008, at 5, 7 (addressing the concept of equitable mootness
in § 363 sales); see also Parkins et al., supra note 12, at 41 & nn.15–19 (citing additional instances unrelated to
reorganizations in which courts had considered the doctrine).
24 See TNB Fin., Inc. v. James F. Parker Interests (In re Grimland, Inc.), 243 F.3d 228, 231 n.4 (5th Cir.
2001) (“Equitable mootness normally arises where a [c]hapter 11 reorganization plan is at issue.”); Parkins et
al., supra note 12, at 40 (“[T]he doctrine was judicially created in recognition of the fact that it would be
inequitable, in certain circumstances, to overturn a confirmed plan of reorganization.”).
25 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (2006) (“Notwithstanding any otherwise applicable nonbankruptcy law, a
plan shall . . . .”) (emphasis added).
26 See id. § 1123(a)(1)–(4).
27 See id. §§ 1122(a), 1123(a)(1). “Substantially similar,” though not defined in the Code, has been read
to require claims or interests possessing similar “legal character or effect” against or in the debtor be grouped
together. 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1122.03[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011).
28 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(2)–(3). A class is “impaired” if the plan alters the rights of the claim or
interest holder or does not correct preexisting legal, equitable or contractual issues. See id. § 1124.
29 Id. § 1123(a)(5).
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Finally, the Code also allows a plan to include a number of nonrequired
actions.30
Once a chapter 11 plan has been drafted, its proponent must present it to
claim or interest holders for approval before it can be confirmed.31 Holders of
claims or interests vote on the plan individually.32 However, a plan is accepted
or rejected solely by classes of interests or claims, not individuals.33 A class of
claims accepts a plan if over fifty percent of the voting claim holders accept
the plan and if these accepting claim holders hold at least two-thirds of the
total aggregate dollar amount of the claims in the class.34 A class of interests,
on the other hand, accepts a plan merely when the holders of two-thirds of the
amount of allowed interests accept the plan.35 Classification under § 1122 thus
“greatly affects whether the plan will ultimately be accepted by creditors and
interest holders.”36 Furthermore, classifying a class as impaired or not impaired
determines whether the individual claim or interest holders comprising the
class get any say in accepting or rejecting the plan.37
Once a plan meeting the requirements of § 1123(a) has been proposed and
voted upon by claim or interest holders, the court holds a confirmation
hearing.38 During this hearing, any party in interest can object to
confirmation.39 The court can confirm a plan only if it meets the applicable
provisions of § 1129; it is given no discretion to demand less or more of a
30

See, e.g., id. § 1123(b); 7 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 1123.02.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1126.
32 See id. § 1126(a).
33 David Arthur Skeel, Jr., The Nature and Effect of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 Reorganization
Cases, 78 VA. L. REV. 461, 477 (1992) (“[T]he emphasis of [§] 1126 rests on whether the class as a whole
votes for or against the plan.”).
34 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c).
35 Id. § 1126(d).
36 Richard M. Cieri, Barbara J. Oyer & Dorothy J. Birnbryer, “The Long and Winding Road”: The
Standards To Confirm a Plan of Reorganization Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code (Part II), 3 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 115, 128–29 (1994).
37 See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f)–(g). If a class is not impaired under the plan, the courts will “conclusively
presume[]” that the class has accepted the plan and the plan proponent does not have to solicit votes from that
class. Id. § 1126(f). On the other hand, if a class is denied any recovery or retention under the plan, it is
deemed to reject the plan, thus eliminating the need to solicit votes. Id. § 1126(g). These totally impaired
classes must be “crammed down” under § 1129(b) for the plan to be confirmed. See 6 WILLIAM L. NORTON,
JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW & PRACTICE 3D § 110:23, at 110-72 to -73 (2008)
(“[I]f the plan is to be confirmed over the voluntary or deemed dissent of one or more classes, it must satisfy
the standards for cramdown under Code § 1129(b).”).
38 11 U.S.C. § 1128(a). Unlike many other sections in the Code that require “notice and a hearing,”
courts must hold an actual hearing to confirm a plan.
39 Id. § 1128(b).
31
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plan40 and instead must exercise “a mandatory independent duty to determine
whether the plan has met all of the requirements necessary for confirmation.”41
Section 1129 outlines the requirements that a plan proponent must demonstrate
before a plan can be confirmed. Some requirements only apply in specific
cases,42 but others apply to all chapter 11 cases.43 Such general requirements
include, but are not limited to: that the plan be proposed legally and in good
faith;44 that at least one class of impaired claims accepts the plan if any class of
claims are impaired;45 that each individual claim or interest holder who has not
accepted the plan will receive at least as much as she would in a chapter 7
liquidation;46 and that the proposed plan is unlikely to be followed by
liquidation or further financial reorganization.47
Furthermore, § 1129(a) contemplates that a plan will only be confirmed if
all impaired classes have accepted the plan by § 1126’s required majorities.48
However, unlike all the other subparts of § 1129(a),49 the Code allows a plan
proponent to bypass subsection (a)(8)’s dictates and confirm a plan over the
rejection of an impaired class of claims or interests.50 To do so, the plan
proponent must meet two additional requirements to “cram down” these
objecting classes. First, the plan cannot discriminate unfairly against a
dissenting class.51 Second, the plan must be “fair and equitable” to each
impaired class.52 This power is not unlimited, however, as the plan proponent
is the only individual allowed to request that a class be crammed down,53 and
at least one impaired class of claims must still affirmatively accept the plan.54

40 See id. § 1129(a) (“The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are
met . . . .”) (emphasis added); id. § 1129(b) (requiring confirmation if alternative requirements to § 1129(a)(8)
are met).
41 In re Holthoff, 58 B.R. 216, 218 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985), quoted in Williams v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank
(In re Williams), 850 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1988).
42 See 7 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 1129.02[6], [13]–[16].
43 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1)–(5), (7), (9)–(12).
44 Id. § 1129(a)(3).
45 Id. § 1129(a)(10).
46 Id. § 1129(a)(7).
47 Id. § 1129(a)(11).
48 See id. § 1129(a)(8).
49 7 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 1129.02[8] (“The condition set forth in [§] 1129(a)(8) is the only
condition precedent which is not absolutely necessary for confirmation.”).
50 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 6 NORTON, supra note 37, § 113:2, at 113-4.
54 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10).
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2. Illustrative Reasons Why Parties Might Appeal a Confirmed Chapter 11
Plan
Before turning to the structure of bankruptcy appeals, a few illustrative
examples will be useful to demonstrate why a party would appeal the
confirmation of a reorganization plan. A party could believe it was lumped
together with a dissimilar claim to impermissibly gerrymander a class vote,55
or was crammed down while an artificially impaired class56 was used to satisfy
§ 1129(a)(10).57 Because the minimum amount that a dissenting party is
guaranteed to receive is defined by the strictly mechanical distribution of
chapter 7,58 undervaluation of a key asset could deprive a crammed-down
claim or interest holder from potentially recovering on her claim.59 Retired
parties might believe that the reorganizing debtor was improperly allowed to
eliminate their pension plan.60 Appellants could be concerned that prepetition
management, whose illegal prepetition conduct had led the corporation to
bankruptcy, will remain in control during the reorganization.61 In these and
similar situations, parties would wish to use the appeals process to guarantee
that the correct decision was reached below.
B. The Bankruptcy Appeals Process
As the doctrine of equitable mootness arises primarily within the
framework of the bankruptcy appellate system, a brief examination of these
structures and their underlying policies is prudent. Appeals in bankruptcy
proceedings are subject to starkly conflicting demands. There is a particular
need for finality in bankruptcy: the more the potential buyers’ reliance interests
are protected, the more they will rely on bankruptcy determinations and pay
higher prices for the debtor’s assets than they would if the “assets [could] be

55

See 7 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 1122.03[5].
An “artificially impaired” class is a class of claims whose rights are modified specifically to create an
accepting impaired class as required by § 1129(a)(10). See id. ¶ 1124.03.
57 See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber
Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 238, 250–51 (5th Cir. 2009).
58 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7); 7 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 1129.02[7][b].
59 See, e.g., Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2001) (interest
holders appealed a $300 million valuation of debtor, claiming debtor was actually worth $1.05 billion).
60 See, e.g., Retired Pilots Ass’n of US Airways, Inc. v. US Airways Grp., Inc. (In re US Airways Grp.,
Inc.), 369 F.3d 806, 807–09 (4th Cir. 2004).
61 See, e.g., Curreys of Neb., Inc. v. United Producers, Inc. (In re United Producers, Inc.), 526 F.3d 942,
945 (6th Cir. 2008).
56
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snatched back or otherwise affected by subsequent events.”62 However, the
right to meaningful appeal, even though not constitutionally guaranteed in all
cases, is also deeply ingrained in American jurisprudence.63
All appeals from a bankruptcy court are raised pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158.
Section 158 offers three routes for an appellant to pursue review of core
matters.64 The two most common routes include either appealing to the district
court embracing the district in which the bankruptcy judge sits,65 or to the BAP
if the circuit has established one.66 A third option—a direct appeal to the court
of appeals embracing the district in which the bankruptcy court is located—is
also available in certain situations.67
Parties who wish to appeal a result from the bankruptcy court are entitled to
have the judgment reviewed by the district court.68 Appeals are available as a
matter of right for all “final judgments, orders, and decrees,”69 as well as from
interlocutory orders changing the time periods set out in 11 U.S.C. § 1121.70 A
court’s confirmation of a reorganization plan, which effectively ends many
disputes related to a reorganization effort,71 can be appealed immediately
62 In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 770 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting further that this protection benefits
creditors as a whole by ensuring that the estate gets good returns in leveraging its assets). Several provisions of
the Code thus limit the ability of parties to interfere with these settled expectation interests. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§ 364(e) (forbidding reversal on appeal of extension of credit for debt, priority interest, or lien in good faith
from affecting such debt’s validity unless the incurring of debt was stayed pending appeal); Id. § 1141(c)
(stripping the debtor’s property of all prepetition claims or interests upon confirmation of the plan unless the
plan or confirmation order provides otherwise).
63 Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 641–42; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring—at bare
minimum—a grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, “with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make”).
64 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b)(1), (d)(2)(A) (2006). The Code divides issues in bankruptcy cases into two
groups: core and noncore proceedings. See id. § 157(b). A bankruptcy court cannot issue a final judgment on
noncore matters, unless all parties consent to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. Id. § 157(c). If all parties do
not consent, the bankruptcy court can only offer proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, which the
district court must then review de novo. Id. § 157(c)(1). In situations where the district court serves as a trial
court in hearing bankruptcy matters, appeals from the district court’s bankruptcy determinations are made to
the court of appeals by way of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 8 NORTON, supra note 37, § 170:19, at 170–74.
65 28 U.S.C. § 158(a); see 1 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 5.02[1].
66 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)–(c).
67 See id. § 158(d)(2)(A).
68 Id. § 158(a).
69 Id. § 158(a)(1).
70 Id. § 158(a)(2). The justification for this provision is that an “undue extension” of exclusivity could
unduly harm the interests of creditors by causing great and extensive delays. See H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 36
(1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3344–45.
71 See Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 747, 789 (2010).
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because it is a “final” order.72 Alternatively, in some jurisdictions,73 an
appellant can take her appeal to a bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP).74 A BAP
is a panel composed of three bankruptcy judges from the circuit in which the
district court sits who are authorized to hear appeals from the bankruptcy
courts.75 Thus, the role of the BAP while hearing appeals under the Code
appears to be the same as the district court’s,76 even if the precise authority of
each court varies.77
There are, however, a few key differences between a district court in its
appellate role and the BAP panel. Unlike its treatment of appeals to the district
court, the Code automatically funnels appeals to the BAP in circuits that have
authorized them78 unless either the appellant or another party to the suit
chooses to be heard by the district court.79 Furthermore, even in circuits that
have adopted a BAP, an appellant cannot be heard by the panel if the district in
which the appeal occurs does not permit appeals to the panel.80 Much like the
initial grant of “original and exclusive jurisdiction” over title 11 cases to the

72 See 1 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 5.08[2]. The converse is not true, however: a party cannot
immediately appeal an order denying confirmation of a plan because the party retains the ability to submit a
new or modified plan. Id. ¶ 5.08[5]. An appellant can also seek appeals for other types of interlocutory orders,
whether arising in the normal course of the proceedings or under 28 U.S.C. § 157; however, these appeals
require the leave of the bankruptcy court to do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
73 Bankruptcy Appellate Panels have been established by the First, Sixth, Eight, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit
Courts of Appeals. 1 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 5.02[3][b].
74 28 U.S.C. § 158(b). The Code requires each circuit to create a BAP unless a circuit determines that it
has “insufficient judicial resources” or that creating the panel would result in “undue delay or increased cost”
for parties in bankruptcy. Id. § 158(b)(1)(A)–(B). In an effort to circumvent these possible limitations, the
Code allows two or more circuits to seek authorization by the Judicial Conference of the United States to
establish a joint bankruptcy panel authorized to hear appeals from any constituent circuit. See id. § 158(b)(4).
75 Id. § 158(b)(1).
76 See id. § 158(c)(2) (“An appeal under subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be taken in the same
manner as appeals in civil proceedings generally are taken to the courts of appeals from the district courts and
in the time provided by Rule 8002 of the Bankruptcy Rules.”).
77 See 8 NORTON, supra note 37, § 170:8, at 170-38.
78 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1). This opt-out procedure—that is, presumed consent to BAP review—
represents a change implemented by the 1994 Amendments; previously, an appeal by the then-Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel Service “could be heard ‘upon consent’ of the parties” without addressing whether one could
consent simply by not objecting. 8 NORTON, supra note 37, § 170:5, at 170-21.
79 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1)(A)–(B).
80 Id. § 158(b)(6) (“Appeals may not be heard under this subsection by a panel of the [BAP] service
unless the district judges for the district in which the appeals occur, by majority vote, have authorized such
service to hear and determine appeals originating in such district.”). This structure can lead to odd situations.
For instance, the Sixth Circuit’s BAP is only authorized to hear appeals coming from “the Northern and
Southern Districts of Ohio, the Western District of Michigan, the Western District of Tennessee, the Middle
District of Tennessee and the Eastern District of Kentucky.” 1 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 5.02[3][b].
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district courts,81 this appellate structure reflects a congressional attempt to
avoid the overly broad jurisdictional grants to Article I courts that the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co.82
Bankruptcy cases reach the United States Courts of Appeals in two ways.
First, a court of appeals can accept an appeal directly from a bankruptcy court
judgment.83 Either the lower court, or the appellees and appellants collectively,
must certify that the appealed issue falls into at least one of three categories:
(1) the issue involves a question of law in which there is no controlling circuit
or Supreme Court decision or involves a matter of public importance; (2) the
issue is a question of law whose resolution requires choosing from conflicting
decisions; or (3) an immediate appeal would advance the progress of the case
or proceeding.84 Second, a court of appeals may hear all appeals from district
courts and BAPs.85 In this situation, the court of appeals acts as the middle of
the three-tiered appeals route, reviewing the judgments of the BAP or the
district court86 and being reviewable in turn by the Supreme Court.87
C. Equitable Mootness: A Potent Doctrine of Prudential Power
Primarily found in bankruptcy appeals, the equitable mootness doctrine
allows a reviewing court to avoid evaluating the appealed claim on its merits
for equitable or prudential reasons.88 An oddity in a body of law so heavily
driven by statutory interpretation,89 this doctrine is not defined by any specific
Code provision but has instead grown out of the various circuits’ accumulated
case law regarding certain equitable notions underlying the Code.90 At its
81 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a). All district courts have been given the right to refer some or all bankruptcy
claims to the bankruptcy judges in their district. See id. § 157(a); 1 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 3.01[1].
82 See 1 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶¶ 3.01[1], 5.02[3][a].
83 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).
84 Id. § 158(d)(2)(A)(i)–(iii). Certification is made subject to the constraints of Rule 8001 of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001(f).
85 See 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1).
86 See id.
87 Id. § 1254; 1 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 5.01.
88 See, e.g., Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1337–38 (10th Cir. 2009).
89 See Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a Bankruptcy Court: A Statutory Court of
Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (2005) (“In other words, a bankruptcy judge’s
powers stem virtually exclusively from statutes.”).
90 See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 558 n.1 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“Because the doctrine often
called ‘equitable mootness’ is well accepted, there is little discussion in the case law of its historical basis.”).
Then-Judge Alito, writing in dissent, offered a possible history, tracing the doctrine’s roots to the Ninth
Circuit’s pre-Code decision in In re Roberts Farms, Inc. See id. at 569–70 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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heart, equitable mootness reflects one of the fundamental policies of
bankruptcy: finality. For bankruptcy relief to encourage “orderly
reorganization and settlement of debtor estates,” courts should respect the
finality of a confirmed plan and overturn it only for good reasons.91
1. The Differences Between Equitable, Statutory, and Constitutional
Mootness
Most courts have taken great pains to distinguish equitable mootness from
constitutional mootness and statutory mootness, the two other forms of
mootness that arise in bankruptcy.92 Constitutional mootness, also known as
jurisdictional mootness, arises when some change in circumstance has
confounded the court’s ability “to grant ‘any effectual relief whatever’” during
the appeal.93 The threshold for constitutional mootness is set high; as long as
the court “can fashion some form of meaningful relief, even if it only partially
redresses the [appealing party’s] grievances,” the court has the authority to
act.94 Statutory mootness, on the other hand, arises from specific Code
provisions directly limiting an appellate court’s ability to overturn certain
postpetition financial transactions, specifically those involving sales or leases
of property95 or extensions of credit through debt, a lien, or priority to a
debtor.96 Unless a party can show that the creditor, buyer, or lessor did not
transact in good faith, a “reversal or modification” of the transaction’s
authorization on appeal will not invalidate the transaction itself.97 In contrast,
equitable mootness focuses less on whether a court can legally affect a change

91 See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994); Rochman v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Grp. (In re
Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H.), 963 F.2d 469, 471–72 (1st Cir. 1992).
92 See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 558 (differentiating narrow Article III discussion from “the
broader interpretation of mootness applied in bankruptcy cases”). But see Focus Media, Inc. v. NBC (In re
Focus Media, Inc.), 378 F.3d 916, 922–23 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Bankruptcy appeals may become moot in one of
two (somewhat overlapping) ways.”).
93 In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 558 (quoting Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12
(1992)); see also In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 963 F.2d at 471 (“Jurisdictional concerns may arise from the
constitutional limitations imposed on the exercise of Article III judicial power . . . where no effective remedy
can be provided . . . .”). Examples of constitutionally moot issues include appeals based on a law that has been
repealed or an appeal involving a candidate in an election campaign controversy who had since withdrawn his
candidacy. See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 558.
94 In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 558 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95 11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2006). This “safe harbor” is not invalidated by knowledge of the appeal or the
possibility of an appeal; however, if the sale or lease is stayed pending an appeal, a court can invalidate it. Id.
96 Id. § 364(e).
97 Id. §§ 363(m), 364(e). However, there is no precise definition of what constitutes good faith. See 3
COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶¶ 363.11, 364.06[1].
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and more on whether doing so would inequitably disturb the “parties’ settled
expectations and the ability of a debtor to emerge from bankruptcy.”98
2. Testing an Appealed Claim for Equitable Mootness
To evaluate this “balancing of the equities” effectively, the circuits have
crafted or adopted various tests to consider claims of equitable mootness.99
Most courts apply a factor-based test that, with a certain amount of variation in
wording and emphasis in the individual courts of appeals,100 weighs each of the
following:
(1) [W]hether a stay has been obtained; (2) whether the plan has been
substantially consummated; (3) whether the relief requested would
affect the rights of parties not before the [c]ourt; (4) whether the
relief requested would affect the success of the confirmed plan; and
(5) the public policy of affording finality to bankruptcy court
101
judgments.

The precise form of this test varies among the circuits,102 with some courts
omitting a factor,103 collapsing two factors into one,104 or adding an additional
factor.105 A few courts employ tests that vary considerably in their underlying
construction. For instance, the Seventh Circuit uses a list of factors that are
98 Curreys of Neb., Inc. v. United Producers, Inc. (In re United Producers, Inc.), 526 F.3d 942, 947 (6th
Cir. 2008); see also In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769–70 (7th Cir. 1994) (“There is a big difference
between inability to alter the outcome (real mootness) and unwillingness to alter the outcome (‘equitable
mootness’).”).
99 For a comprehensive overview of these varying tests, see generally Rosiek, supra note 14.
100 See id. at 697–99.
101 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Milk Palace Dairy, LLC (In re Milk Palace Dairy, LLC), 327 B.R. 462, 468
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2005) (footnotes omitted), quoted in Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584
F.3d 1327, 1338 (10th Cir. 2009).
102 Concerns about possible variations in outcomes arising from differing forms of equitable mootness
have led some commentators to call for a unified application of the doctrine. See generally Rosiek, supra note
14.
103 See, e.g., In re United Producers, Inc., 526 F.3d at 947–48. Some courts have explicitly refused to
consider the factor regarding the public policy in favor of affording finality to bankruptcy judgments. See, e.g.,
id. at 947 n.2. However, it has been noted that this consideration is actually the animating reason for the
doctrine, and it is likely implicitly considered if not explicitly discussed. See Bruce H. White & William L.
Medford, Equitable Mootness and Substantial Consummation: Are You Losing Your Right to Your Appeal?,
AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2001, at 26, 26.
104 See, e.g., United States ex rel. FCC v. GWI PCS 1 Inc. (In re GWI PCS 1 Inc.), 230 F.3d 788, 800 (5th
Cir. 2000) (collapsing two factors—the effect on third parties not before the court granting the requested relief
or the effect on the success of the plan—into one factor).
105 See, e.g., In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1339 (adding the following factor: “(6) [B]ased upon a quick look at
the merits of appellant’s challenge to the plan, is appellant’s challenge legally meritorious or equitably
compelling?”).
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similar to the factors articulated above in some regards,106 but this list
represents more of an ambiguous approach with “a set of loose guidelines,
rather than a step-by-step test.”107 Regardless of name or form, the equitable
mootness doctrine has been implemented in all circuits.108
A court generally grants equitable mootness in one of three situations. First,
a court will invoke the doctrine when granting an appeal on the merits would
completely dismantle a confirmed and implemented reorganization plan.109
Second, it will similarly dismiss a case when granting the appeal “would knock
the props out from under the authorization for every transaction that has taken
place . . . [and] do nothing other than create an unmanageable, uncontrollable
situation for the [b]ankruptcy [c]ourt.”110 Finally, courts will grant equitable
mootness when the requested relief would substantially undercut the interests
of third parties not before it.111 When none of these three conditions are
present, however, courts are more skeptical that the claim is equitably moot
and much less likely to dismiss the appeal.112

106 Other factors considered include the following: the underlying policy grounds of finality; the passage
of time since the confirmation of the plan; whether the plan has been acted upon or substantially
consummated; any substantial changes in circumstances; whether the appellants have sought a stay; the effect
of granting relief on innocent third parties; and the impact of the relief on the debtor and third parties. In re
Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir. 1993). Importantly, there is nothing in the court’s language
to suggest that these are the only factors to consider, thus implying that this test is more pliable than other
circuits’ tests. Compare id. (noting that an equitable mootness evaluation also involved weighing a “number of
subsidiary elements,” and describing these lower elements with the inclusive word “including”), with In re
United Producers, Inc., 526 F.3d at 947 n.2 (refusing to consider factors not already in the test as adopted).
107 Rosiek, supra note 14, at 702.
108 See In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1337–38 (10th Cir. 2009) (listing cases from every other circuit that
adopted the doctrine when considering whether “equitable, prudential, or pragmatic considerations can render
an appeal of a bankruptcy court decision moot even when the appeal is not constitutionally moot”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
109 See, e.g., In re United Producers, Inc., 526 F.3d at 950–51; Rochman v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Grp. (In re
Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H.), 963 F.2d 469, 473–76 (1st Cir. 1992).
110 Trone v. Roberts Farms, Inc. (In re Roberts Farms, Inc.), 652 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir. 1981), quoted in
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1993).
111 See, e.g., Retired Pilots Ass’n of US Airways, Inc. v. US Airways Grp., Inc. (In re US Airways Grp.,
Inc.), 369 F.3d 806, 810 (4th Cir. 2004) (granting the requested relief and reimposing a pension plan “would
directly undermine the interests of those lenders that expressly conditioned their loans on resolution of this
issue”).
112 See Hilal v. Williams (In re Hilal), 534 F.3d 498, 500–01 (5th Cir. 2008) (professional compensation
in chapter 11 plan); United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton (In re United Artists Theatre Co.), 315 F.3d 217, 228
(3d Cir. 2003) (indemnity provision); Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc. v. Knupfer (In re PW, LLC), 391 B.R. 25,
33–35 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (lien stripping).
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3. Criticism of the Equitable Mootness Doctrine
Equitable mootness serves an important function by ensuring that appeals
do not interfere with a debtor’s chances of successfully reorganizing or cause
unmanageable situations for bankruptcy courts.113 However, the doctrine is not
without its critics. Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit, although
accepting of the doctrine’s underlying rationale in preserving reorganization
efforts, took issue with the designation “equitable mootness.”114 He believed
using the term “mootness” to describe two different situations—both a court’s
“inability to alter the outcome” and its “unwillingness to alter the outcome”—
“breeds confusion.”115 Other commentators have criticized the doctrine more
harshly. Then-Judge Alito of the Third Circuit, having addressed the doctrine
in two different cases,116 believed that the doctrine as adopted could “easily be
used as a weapon to prevent any appellate review of bankruptcy court orders
confirming reorganization plans.”117 Critics also view the doctrine as allowing
Article III courts to shirk their duties by delegating too much of their inherent
authority to the bankruptcy courts118 or allowing the courts to exercise
judicially created powers in considerable excess of those explicitly granted by
the Code.119
D. “All Appellate Gaul”120: The Standards of Review in Bankruptcy Appeals
Having tracked the issue from plan confirmation through the first-level
appellate determination of equitable mootness, this Comment now turns to the
standards of review used by second-level appellate courts. Appellate courts
have two duties that sometimes conflict: ensuring a coherent and clear body of
precedent while also ensuring that the public can attach an appropriate level of
certainty to a lower court’s determinations.121 Standards of review are one of

113

See In re Roberts Farms, Inc., 652 F.2d at 797.
In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769 (7th Cir. 1994).
115 Id.
116 See Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 191–92 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.,
concurring); In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 567–73 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Alito, J., dissenting).
117 In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d at 192 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J., concurring).
118 See Knight, supra note 14, at 280–81.
119 See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 572 (Alito, J., dissenting); Murphy, supra note 14, at 46.
120 See Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 173 (1978) (“All
appellate Gaul . . . is divided into three parts: review of facts, review of law, and review of discretion.”).
121 See Timothy J. Storm, The Standard of Review Does Matter: Evidence of Judicial Self-Restraint in the
Illinois Appellate Court, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 73, 75–78 (2009).
114
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the two primary ways that appellate courts carry out these duties, as they
define which issues will receive more or less exacting review.122
Implementing the correct standard of review for the given issue creates a
number of benefits. An individual appellant will have notice and thus have a
rough approximation of “how good” her claim will have to be to successfully
appeal a given issue.123 This benefit allows parties with weaker claims to avoid
filing spurious appeals,124 while allowing those with more meritorious cases to
craft their argument appropriately.125 Having an appropriate standard of review
also helps to maintain a proper balance of power between the lower and higher
courts and promote judicial economy by limiting the number of potential
appeals.126 However, these benefits are only possible if the “standard is
understood [and applied] consistently among judges of the reviewing
courts.”127
Courts of appeal in bankruptcy matters generally apply three standards of
review: (1) findings of fact by the trial court under the clearly erroneous
standard; (2) findings of law by the trial court under the de novo standard; and
(3) issues of discretion under the abuse of discretion standard.128 The clearly
erroneous standard requires that a reviewing court only overturn a trial court’s

122

See id. at 78–80. The other method concerns narrowing appellate jurisdiction. See id. at 78, 81–82.
Peters, supra note 21, at 241–42. More eloquently stated, “Reading these standards of review is not
merely a help to the court; they also indicate the decibel level at which the appellate advocate must play to
catch the judicial ear.” Alvin B. Rubin, The Admiralty Case on Appeal in the Fifth Circuit, 43 LA. L. REV. 869,
873 (1983).
124 Peters, supra note 21, at 241.
125 Id. at 241–42.
126 Id. at 238–42.
127 Storm, supra note 121, at 89. There is a sense in the scholarship that, whether due to the admitted
difficulties in precisely defining the standards or to a lack of interest, these standards are not as fully examined
or understood as they should be. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 21, at 247 (“Often appellate judges ignore the
standards of review, are confused by them, or cleverly manipulate them to achieve a specific result.”); Storm,
supra note 121, at 78–79 (“[T]he standard of review is often viewed as an afterthought by many practitioners,
as well as by some appellate court judges.”); Kelly Kunsch, Standard of Review (State & Federal): A Primer,
18 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 11, 12 (1994) (noting that standards of review have been “virtually ignored by legal
scholars,” while courts either ignore the standard outright, state the appropriate standard and then ignore it,
invoke the standard “talismanically to authenticate” their opinions, or characterize the appropriate standard for
an issue in a manner that is ultimately outcome determinative).
128 See, e.g., Michel v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. (In re Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc.), 44 F.3d 1310,
1315 (6th Cir. 1995). Although these issues are not described in universally applicable language, “the scope of
actual disagreement is narrow.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400 (1990). Moreover, a
fourth standard—the “substantial evidence” standard—is used to review jury fact-finding. See Kevin Casey,
Jade Camara & Nancy Wright, Standards of Appellate Review in the Federal Circuit: Substance and
Semantics, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 279, 286 (2002). It will not be discussed further here.
123
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finding of fact when no evidence exists to support the contention or, “although
there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”129
Both first-level and second-level appellate courts are required to extend this
deference to the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact.130 Questions of law, on the
other hand, are reviewed de novo by both the first and second appellate
levels;131 this means that the reviewing court owes no deference to the lower
court’s determination. In bankruptcy proceedings involving core matters, such
as plan confirmation,132 this results in the second-level appellate court
effectively providing de novo review to the determinations of the first-level
appellate court.133
Reviewing a determination for an abuse of discretion is perhaps the most
difficult standard to apply appropriately.134 The abuse of discretion standard is
used to review discretionary rulings,135 which most frequently involve
procedural issues concerning the smooth running and supervision of a court.136
This standard is widely viewed as the most deferential of the three standards
discussed here.137 However, differing definitions for an abuse of discretion
129

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
See Tech. Lending Partners LLC v. San Patricio Cnty. Cmty. Action Agency (In re San Patricio Cnty.
Cmty. Action Agency), 575 F.3d 553, 557 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that when reviewing an appeal from the
lower court, courts of appeal “apply the same standard of review to the bankruptcy court’s ruling as did the
district court”); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 8013 (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside [by a district court or BAP] unless clearly erroneous . . . .”).
131 Crowell v. Theodore Bender Accounting, Inc. (In re Crowell), 138 F.3d 1031, 1033 (5th Cir. 1998).
132 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L) (2006).
133 See Precision Steel Shearing, Inc., v. Fremont Fin. Corp. (In re Visual Indus., Inc.), 57 F.3d 321, 324
(3rd Cir. 1995) (“Because the district court sits as an appellate court in bankruptcy cases, our review of the
district court’s decision is plenary.”). However, “[w]hen the district court has acted as a trial court, and [28
U.S.C. §] 158(d) does not apply, the normal appellate procedures found in title 28 will apply[,]” and the court
of appeals will apply the “clearly erroneous” standard of review to the district court’s findings of fact. See 1
COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 5.11; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (requiring that the court of appeals accept a
district court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous).
134 See Ronald R. Hofer, Standards of Review—Looking Beyond the Labels, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 231, 245
(1991) (“While concepts of fact and law can be grasped intuitively, although imperfectly, the concept of
discretion does not provide us with as convenient a handle.”).
135 See generally Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 172–81.
136 See Storm, supra note 121, at 88–89. However, there are some substantive issues—such as child
custody or criminal sentencing—left to the discretion of the lower court. Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 173.
137 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 21, at 243 (noting that abuse of discretion is “the [standard] most
deferential to trial court decisions”). Under de novo review, the trial court’s determination is protected by a
“gossamer film,” while abuse of discretion serves to “safeguard[] [the trial court’s decision] by a Kevlar
shield.” See, e.g., id. at 246 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Francis M. Allegra, Section 482:
Mapping the Contours of the Abuse of Discretion Standard of Judicial Review, 13 VA. TAX REV. 423, 473
(1994)).
130
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allow for varying amounts of deference given the trial court. As Judge Friendly
reflected,
There are a half dozen different definitions of “abuse of discretion,”
ranging from ones that would require the appellate court to come
close to finding that the trial court had taken leave of its senses to
others which differ from the definition of error by only the slightest
138
nuance, with numerous variations between the extremes.

A brief comparison will demonstrate this variation. One leading legal
dictionary defines an “abuse of discretion” as “[a]n appellate court’s standard
for reviewing a decision that is asserted to be grossly unsound, unreasonable,
illegal, or unsupported by the evidence.”139 Using this definition, it would
appear virtually impossible to overcome a determination that is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. However, other courts have defined an “abuse
of discretion” much more anemically: “[W]hen judicial action is taken in a
discretionary matter, such action cannot be set aside by a reviewing court
unless it has a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a
clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the
relevant factors.”140 Thus, it is clear that where the decision involves a
discretionary doctrine, a review for abuse of discretion can vary considerably
in the amount of deference it will offer a lower court.
II. A TALE OF TWO STANDARDS: IN RE PAIGE’S ADOPTION OF THE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION STANDARD AND THE WIDENING CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. In re Paige’s Adoption of the Abuse of Discretion Standard
The most recent instance of a court of appeals reviewing equitable
mootness for an abuse of discretion in binding precedent is the Tenth Circuit’s
decision in In re Paige.141 Two parties, Search Market Direct, Inc. (SMDI) and
ConsumerInfo.com (ConsumerInfo), sought to take possession of the domain
name “FreeCreditScore.com” from the liquidating debtor, Steve Zimmer
Paige.142 To this end, both SMDI and ConsumerInfo filed competing plans for
138

Friendly, supra note 22, at 763.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 11 (9th ed. 2009).
140 In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954), quoted in Friendly, supra note 22, at 764.
141 See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1334–36 (10th Cir. 2009). Prior to
that, the most recent decision was from the Sixth Circuit in 2008. See Curreys of Neb., Inc. v. United
Producers, Inc. (In re United Producers, Inc.), 526 F.3d 942, 946–47 (6th Cir. 2008).
142 See In re Paige, No. 05-34474, 2007 WL 4143212, at *7 (Bankr. D. Utah Nov. 13, 2007), aff’d sub
nom. Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 439 B.R. 786 (D. Utah 2010).
139
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liquidation in chapter 11.143 At the confirmation hearing, the Bankruptcy Court
for the District of Utah held that SMDI’s plan did not meet the requirements of
§ 1129(a)(1), (a)(3), or (a)(11), and refused to confirm it.144 ConsumerInfo’s
joint plan did not have these deficiencies and was confirmed on October 15,
2007.145
SMDI appealed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, alleging
that several of the bankruptcy judge’s findings of fact regarding the confirmed
plan were in error and seeking to substitute its rejected plan for the confirmed
plan.146 In opposition, ConsumerInfo and the chapter 11 trustee asserted that
SDMI’s claims were both constitutionally and equitably moot and should be
dismissed.147 Judge Stewart dismissed the appeal on both grounds.148 First, he
found the case constitutionally moot because reversal would entail disgorging
payments from many parties unrelated to the suit and over whom the court did
not have power; therefore, it would be “impossible for the court to grant any
effectual relief whatever.”149 Furthermore, the court examined the factual
record after confirmation.150 Although noting that SMDI tried and failed to
obtain a stay pending appeal,151 the court found the appeal equitably moot
because the plan had been substantially consummated when all of the required
payments had been distributed.152 Moreover, the court believed that granting
the desired relief would have significant detrimental effects on third party
interests, the success of the plan, and the public policy favoring finality in
bankruptcy.153
SMDI then appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which reversed the lower court
on both grounds. 154 Addressing the issue of constitutional mootness first, the
court noted that it traditionally reviewed such claims de novo and reversed
because ConsumerInfo had not demonstrated conclusively that both of the

143

Id. at *6.
Id. at *10, *14, *20–21.
145 Id. at *8, *14, *20–21.
146 Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), No. 2:07-CV-822 TS, 2008 WL 2064628, at *1–2 (D.
Utah May 13, 2008), rev’d, 584 F.3d 1327.
147 See id. at *2.
148 Id. at *4–5.
149 Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
150 See id. at *3–4.
151 Id. at *5.
152 Id. at *7.
153 Id. at *5–7.
154 See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1348–49 (10th Cir. 2009).
144
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requested forms of relief were simply impossible to grant.155 Turning to
equitable mootness, the court addressed which standard of review it should
apply.156 Noting a split between the circuits,157 the court honed in on the heart
of the disagreement: other doctrines that were discretionary or equitable in
nature received deference, but plenary reviews of a decision by a first-level
appellate court were the norm in bankruptcy cases.158 Comparing the equitable
mootness doctrine to prudential mootness,159 the court noted that both
doctrines were discretionary responses used when the court had authority to
fashion a remedy for a live controversy and ultimately refused to do so due to
concerns regarding the effect on outside parties.160 Having previously ascribed
abuse of discretion review to determinations of prudential mootness,161 the
court extended the same deferential standard to the lower court’s determination
of equitable mootness.162 However, notwithstanding its adoption of this
supposedly highly deferential review, the court of appeals reversed the lower
court and remanded for an ultimate determination on the merits.163
B. Lay of the Land: Equitable Mootness Review in Federal Courts
Only four circuits have definitively addressed which standard of review
should be applied to equitable mootness determinations. The Fifth and Sixth
Circuits review the determinations de novo164 while the Third and Tenth
Circuits favor deference, reviewing these determinations for abuse of
155

Id. at 1336–37 (stating that ConsumerInfo had not proven that SMDI did not have the funds necessary
to fulfill its plan and, even if it had, the court could grant at least part of the requested relief by reversing the
confirmation of ConsumerInfo’s plan).
156 Id. at 1334–36.
157 Id. at 1334–35.
158 Id. at 1335.
159 Prudential mootness arises when a court has proper jurisdiction under Article III, but for reasons
related to “prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government,” the court exercises its discretion in
refusing to grant relief. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727–28 (10th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 627 F.2d 289, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1980)) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cited in In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1335 n.7.
160 In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1335 n.7.
161 Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir. 1997), cited in In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1335.
162 In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1335.
163 Id. at 1340–49 (finding that, despite the substantial confirmation of the plan and SMDI’s failure to
seek a stay during the appeal, ConsumerInfo had failed to carry its burden because it did not prove
conclusively the other equitable mootness factors favored dismissal of the appeal). Ultimately, the district
court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s confirmation of ConsumerInfo’s plan. See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v.
Jubber (In re Paige), 439 B.R. 786, 801 (D. Utah 2010).
164 See Curreys of Neb., Inc. v. United Producers, Inc. (In re United Producers, Inc.), 526 F.3d 942, 947
(6th Cir. 2008); United States ex rel. FCC v. GWI PCS 1 Inc. (In re GWI PCS 1 Inc.), 230 F.3d 788, 799–800
(5th Cir. 2000).
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discretion.165 The rest of the circuits have yet to explicitly address the issue,166
have only explicitly considered the issue in nonbinding unpublished
opinions,167 or have not considered the issue at all.168 Additionally, vagueness
in opinions as to the specific type of mootness being addressed has caused
some courts of appeals to believe mistakenly that other circuits have adopted
one standard or another.169
The courts have rarely expounded their reasons for adopting a specific
standard.170 Even then-Judge Alito relegated the portion of his dissent
opposing the adoption of abuse of discretion standard of review to a mere
footnote.171 Most courts have based their ultimate decision on no more than
one of the following factors:172 the equitable and prudential components of the
doctrine; 173 the structural relationship of the district court and the BAPs with
the circuit court in bankruptcy appeals;174 whether a particular judicial officer
was in a better position to evaluate the arguments;175 how doctrines considered
structurally similar had previously been handled in the circuit;176 and any

165

See In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1334–35; In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 560 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
See Retired Pilots Ass’n of US Airways, Inc. v. US Airways Grp., Inc. (In re US Airways Grp., Inc.),
369 F.3d 806, 809 n.* (4th Cir. 2004) (refusing to consider the issue since it did not affect the outcome in that
case).
167 See Zeeger v. President Casinos, Inc. (In re President Casinos, Inc.), 409 F. App’x 31, 31–32 (8th Cir.
2010) (per curiam) (reviewing de novo); Olympic Coast Inv., Inc. v. Crum (In re Wright), 329 F. App’x 137,
137 (9th Cir. 2009) (relying on a case blending constitutional and equitable mootness to justify reviewing de
novo); Ad Hoc Comm. of Kenton Cnty. Bondholders v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 309 F. App’x 455, 457 (2d Cir.
2009) (reviewing for abuse of discretion); Liquidity Solutions, Inc. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (In re WinnDixie Store, Inc.), 286 F. App’x 619, 622 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (reviewing de novo).
168 For instance, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to consider the issue at the time of writing.
169 The Fifth Circuit, in adopting de novo review, suggested that other circuits, including the Tenth
Circuit, had already adopted this standard. In re GWI PCS 1 Inc., 230 F.3d at 800 n.23. However, with regards
to the Tenth Circuit, this is clearly not the case. See In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1334–35.
170 See, e.g., In re GWI PCS 1 Inc., 230 F.3d at 799–800.
171 See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 568 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Alito, J., dissenting).
172 See, e.g., In re GWI PCS 1 Inc., 230 F.3d at 799–800. Contra In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1335–36
(considering several of the factors, though ultimately privileging one—the discretionary nature of the
doctrine—over others).
173 See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 560.
174 See id. at 568 n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that, because the district court in bankruptcy is also an
appellate court, circuit court review of their decisions is plenary); see also Curreys of Neb., Inc. v. United
Producers, Inc. (In re United Producers, Inc.), 526 F.3d 942, 946–47 (6th Cir. 2008); In re GWI PCS 1 Inc.,
230 F.3d at 799–800.
175 See In re United Producers, Inc., 526 F.3d at 952–53 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (stating
that because the evaluation of equitable mootness by a BAP or district court is not a review, but rather an
initial determination, deference may be due).
176 See In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1334–36 (seeing similarities between the doctrines of prudential mootness
and equitable mootness).
166
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possible value from the expertise available if the first-level appellate review
had been held before a BAP.177 These arguments also follow two distinct lines
of reasoning. Following the lead of then-Judge Alito’s dissent in In re
Continental Airlines, courts that have adopted de novo review emphasize that
appellate courts in bankruptcy normally give no deference to a lower appellate
court,178 while courts adopting abuse of discretion privilege the doctrine’s
discretionary and equitable characteristics.179
III. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING STANDARD OF REVIEW
QUESTIONS
Determining the proper standard of review is not always a cut-and-dried
issue. As Justice Scalia noted, “For most [doctrines], the answer is provided by
a long history of appellate practice.”180 Elsewhere, the statutory language
provides a clear indication of the intended standard of review.181 However,
when both a clear history of appellate practice and statutory guidance are
absent, “it is uncommonly difficult to derive from the pattern of appellate
review of other questions an analytical framework that will yield the correct
answer.”182 This issue is further complicated because courts tend to read
discretion into statutory language that does not explicitly authorize it183 and,
therefore, the language and formulation of the rule are not always by
themselves determinative.184 However, since equitable mootness is a judicially
created defense,185 courts cannot rely on statutory interpretation to help answer
the present question.

177

In re United Producers, Inc., 526 F.3d at 953 n.1 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
See, e.g., In re GWI PCS 1 Inc., 230 F.3d at 799–800.
179 See, e.g., In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 560.
180 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988).
181 See id. (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows that a court, “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee” (alteration in original) (emphasis added)).
182 Id. at 558–59 (citing Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 638).
183 See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 655–57 (noting that, although the term “discretion” only appeared in
ten of eighty-six Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, appellate courts had read discretion into thirty additional
provisions). Similarly, courts of appeals have viewed phrases like “‘the court may’ order, decree, compel, or
require,” or take actions “for good cause,” “in the interest of justice,” or “to avoid delay or prejudice” as
inherently limiting their ability to overturn a lower court’s determination. Id. at 655. Finally, Professor
Rosenberg notes that, although the word “may” could suggest deferential review, some bodies of law use the
word often enough that one should be skeptical the drafters meant discretion to be used so frequently. See id.
184 See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559 (noting that the statutory language awarding attorney’s fees unless certain
conditions were met would allow, but did not compel, that the appellate courts grant the finding deference).
185 See Parkins et al., supra note 12, at 40.
178
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To address this issue, this Comment relies on both Supreme Court
precedent and scholarship to examine when deference is due and, if so, how
much. The Supreme Court has provided some guidance on when deference is
due to a lower court’s judgment.186 Although none of these opinions arose in
the bankruptcy context and were each primarily concerned with determining
the proper standard when the statute was ambiguous or silent,187 many portions
of the analysis remain useful to assessing whether deference is due to a
determination of equitable mootness.
A. The Guiding Hand of Supreme Court Precedent: Pierce v. Underwood,
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., and Koon v. United States
The Supreme Court has offered significant guidance on distinguishing
between de novo and discretionary review in a handful of decisions. The first
and arguably most influential occurred in Pierce v. Underwood.188 There, the
plaintiffs invoked the recently enacted Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) to
seek attorney’s fees from the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
following a settlement.189 The law allowed a nonfederal party in a suit against
the United States to recover fees “unless the court finds that the position of the
United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust.”190 The district court found for the plaintiffs,191 and the Ninth
Circuit, reviewing the lower court’s decision for abuse of discretion,192
affirmed the award of attorney’s fees.193
In the course of examining the underlying legal doctrine, the Court
eschewed any attempt to create a rigid formula for determining the proper
standard of review for “substantially justified” determinations.194 Instead, it
186 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98–100 (1996), superseded in part by statute, Prosecutorial
Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–21, 117 Stat.
650; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399–405 (1990); Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558–63.
187 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 92–101 (reviewing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984); Cooter & Gell, 496
U.S. at 399–405 (reviewing Rule 11 sanctions); Pierce, 487 U.S. at 558–63 (reviewing the Equal Access to
Justice Act).
188 Pierce, 487 U.S. 552.
189 Id. at 556–57.
190 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988), quoted in Pierce, 487 U.S. at 556.
191 Underwood v. Pierce, 547 F. Supp. 256, 263–64 (C.D. Cal. 1982), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 761 F.2d
1342 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
192 Underwood v. Pierce, 761 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 487 U.S. 552
(1988).
193 Id. at 1348. However, the court rejected the trial court’s specific calculation of the fees, lowering the
respondents’ award significantly. See id. at 1347–48.
194 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559.
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focused on what it considered the most salient factors compelling review for an
abuse of discretion.195 First, it analyzed both the language and the structure of
the statute,196 reading the phrase “unless the court finds” as suggesting an
inference of deference by focusing on the determination as the lower court’s to
make.197 Second, the Court considered how similarly structured aspects from
the same law198 could, by analogy, offer insights into the proper distributions
of authority.199 Third, it evaluated which judicial actor was better positioned,
“as a matter of the sound administration of justice,” to decide the specific
issue.200 In this regard, the Court considered it relevant that the district court’s
“substantially justified” determination could hinge upon unreviewable aspects
of the factual record.201 Additionally, it noted that de novo review would waste
considerable judicial resources because it would require the reviewing court to
completely reexamine the factual record to appraise whether the government
had sufficient grounds for the suit.202 Fourth, the Court considered the
impracticability of formulating a rule for the matter in the issue.203 The Court
was reluctant to “fix or sanction narrow guidelines” to the district courts since
“the number of possible situations [was] large,” and the Court viewed the
flexibility offered by abuse-of-discretion as necessary to develop the doctrine
further.204 Fifth, the Court considered the extent of liability suffered by the
195

1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 4.01[2].
See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
197 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559 (internal quotation marks omitted).
198 As quoted by the Court, the relevant portions provide that “an administrative agency . . . award
attorney’s fees to a litigant prevailing in an agency adjudication if the Government’s position is not
‘substantially justified,’ and specifies that the agency’s decision may be reversed only if a reviewing court
‘finds that the failure to make an award . . . was unsupported by substantial evidence.’” Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C.
§ 504(a)(1), (c)(2) (1988)).
199 Id. (believing it unlikely that the appellate court would give more deference to an agency’s
determination regarding the strength of their own position than it would a similar determination by a district
court).
200 Id. at 559–60 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). Being “better positioned” deals
fundamentally with the idea that one body in a multi-tiered judicial system has advantages over another in
evaluating the various components of a case. Courts of appeals are arguably “better positioned” on questions
of law because they address similar issues more frequently, can implement a uniform system more broadly,
and have multiple minds addressing a handful of problems rather than having to concern themselves with
supervising the trial. Trial courts, on the other hand, are “better positioned” for issues related to factual
determinations and fact-finding due to their extensive familiarity with the specific case. Friendly, supra note
22, at 756–62.
201 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560 (noting that “the district court may have insights not conveyed by the record”
due to their considerable familiarity with the parties, the evidence, and pretrial activity).
202 Id. at 560–61.
203 Id. at 561–62.
204 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (analogizing its past discussion of Rule 54(b) discretionary
certification to interpretations of the “substantially justified” rule). Neither the Court, Professor Rosenberg (on
196

PECHOUS GALLEYSFINAL

2012]

WALKING THE TIGHT ROPE AND NOT THE PLANK

6/8/2012 8:58 AM

571

adversely affected party to be proportional to the amount of review usually
necessary.205 Although finding that the substantial amount of money due by the
government in the instant case necessitate a more exacting review,206 the
normal amount of such awards was much more modest and thus did not
necessitate a higher level of scrutiny.207 Viewing the situation through these
factors,208 “the text of the statute . . . and sound judicial administration”
compelled the Court to hold that deferential review was proper.209
Dissenting, Justice White believed that the default rule favoring de novo
review should take priority because the statute was “wholly silent” as to the
standard of review.210 Additionally, such deference to the lower court’s
determination, he felt, conflicted with judicial values like “consistency and
predictability in [the outcome of] EAJA litigation.”211 Finally, he noted that a
“near unanimity” of the courts of appeals agreed that de novo review was more
appropriate in these cases.212 Applying this less deferential standard, Justice
White argued that the lower court’s holding was mistaken and should be
reversed.213
Addressing a similar issue two years later, the Court in Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp. examined the proper standard of review during an extensive

whom the Court relied considerably), or Judge Friendly addresses what occurs when a rule that once eluded
generalization, but has since found expression, is finally expressed. Does it automatically become a rule of law
subject to de novo review? Or are there situations where the creation of the rule or factor-based tests instead
constitutes a limitation, but not wholesale revocation, of the court’s discretion in its application? See id.;
Friendly, supra note 22, at 762–73; Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 179–82.
205 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 563.
206 The district court had ordered the government to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,129,450. Id.
at 557.
207 Id. at 563 (noting that the median fee in these cases was less than $3,000).
208 Nothing in the Court’s language suggests that these factors are necessarily exclusive; in fact, the
opposite conclusion is the more reasonable inference. See id. at 559 (“No more today than in the past shall we
attempt to discern or to create a comprehensive test; but we are persuaded that significant relevant factors call
for an ‘abuse of discretion’ standard in the present case.”). One last significant factor that the Court did not
consider explicitly, but may have implicitly considered, was whether the doctrine seems on its face to be
discretionary: “i.e., does it smack of judgment, choice, sensitivity, and presence, or is it instead somewhat
informed by broader concepts that seem legal?” See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 4.01[2].
209 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 563.
210 Id. at 583–85 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211 Id. at 585. Because a reviewing court would uphold a district court’s position as long as it was
somewhat defensible, “[t]he availability of attorney’s fees would not only be difficult to predict but would vary
from circuit to circuit or even within a particular circuit.” Id.
212 Id. at 586.
213 See id. at 586–88.
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examination of Rule 11 sanctions.214 In this situation, all circuits agreed that a
level of deference was appropriate but differed considerably on whether the
abuse of discretion applied to only a portion of the rule or to its entirety.215 In
requiring that appellate courts consider all aspects of the rule under the abuse
of discretion standard,216 the Court addressed several points pertinent to
subsequent standard of review issues. It viewed the fact-specific nature of Rule
11 violations as favorable grounds for adopting abuse of discretion review of
all aspects of the decision.217 Indeed, variation in application of the rule is
inevitable because “[f]act-bound resolutions cannot be made uniform through
appellate review, de novo or otherwise.”218 However, an abuse of discretion
exists when such a “fact-bound” resolution is predicated on either a clearly
erroneous factual record or a purely legal error.219 In so holding, the Court
reiterated the validity of the Pierce factors in analyzing the proper standard of
review,220 adding to these an evaluation of the policy goals in Rule 11 that
would be furthered by applying the abuse of discretion standard.221
Finally, in Koon v. United States, the Court held that appellate review of a
district court’s decision to deviate from the ranges in the United States
Sentencing Commission Guidelines in unusual cases should be considered
under an abuse of discretion standard.222 Applying the factors developed in
Pierce v. Underwood and Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., the Court clarified
its application further. In dicta, Justice Kennedy considered that “[t]he
deference that [was] due” might not exist in specific situations where the
214

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 399–405 (1990).
Most of the circuits reviewed all issues involved in examining a Rule 11 violation for abuse of
discretion, while the Ninth Circuit employed a mixed review that looked at the existence of a Rule 11 violation
de novo, the underlying historical facts under the clearly erroneous standard, and the sanction implemented for
abuse of discretion. See id. at 399–400.
216 Id. at 405.
217 Id. at 401–02. The Court considered that such fact-specific examinations must include “all the
circumstances of a case.” Id. at 401. Therefore, “[a]n inquiry that is unreasonable when an attorney has months
to prepare a complaint may be reasonable when he has only a few days before the statute of limitations runs.”
Id. at 401–02.
218 Id. at 405 (quoting Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928, 936 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
219 Id. at 401–02. An example of a purely legal error would include a misunderstanding of Rule 11’s
scope or reliance on an incorrect view of the law. See id.
220 The Court specifically noted the superior position of the district court in the determination and the
extensive range and possible uniqueness of facts entering the court’s calculus. See id. at 403–04 (citing Pierce
v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559–62 (1988)).
221 Id. at 404.
222 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 91 (1996), superseded in part by statute, Prosecutorial Remedies
and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650.
215
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appeal centered around a merely “mathematical error” in applying the
Guidelines.223 In such situations, there is no functional difference in the
positions of the two courts; both are equally able to apply the articulated
formulas.224 Furthermore, Koon makes clear that, while a court’s application of
fact-specific legal standards might deserve deference,225 the underlying legal
components do not: “A district court by definition abuses its discretion when it
makes an error of law.”226 As review of the underlying law is done without
deference, it “might as well be called de novo.”227
B. Determining the Proper Degree of Discretion
This precedent provides a framework for evaluating when deference would
be due to a lower court. However, once a court knows that abuse of discretion
is the proper standard of review for a doctrine, the court must also determine
the applicable threshold for defining when an abuse of discretion has actually
occurred.228 As noted previously,229 this standard is not a single standard but
rather a spectrum ranging from virtually unreviewable decisions to discretion
almost indistinguishable from de novo review.230 Courts apply completely
different versions of the abuse of discretion standard for different issues and,
sometimes, when evaluating alternate outcomes of the same issue.231 In this
regard, Supreme Court precedent is less useful, as the Court has not yet

223

Id. at 98.
Id. Compare this with the situation at hand in Koon: to justify departing from the Guidelines, the trial
judge had to find the facts unusual enough to merit the consideration, consider the facts against the factors the
Guidelines set out for when a deviation is warranted, and assess the case’s “‘ordinariness’ or ‘unusualness’” in
light of their considerable experience in handling sentencing matters. See id. at 98–99.
225 See id.
226 Id. at 100. However, this does not mean that “parts of the review must be labeled de novo while other
parts are labeled an abuse of discretion,” but rather that “[t]he abuse-of-discretion standard includes review to
determine that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.” Id.
227 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 4.01[2].
228 See id. § 4.01[3] (noting that there is “no such thing as one abuse of discretion standard”).
229 See supra text accompanying notes 137–40.
230 See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 650–53; see also Friendly, supra note 22, at 763–64.
231 In the civil context, for instance, it cannot be seriously claimed that the same abuse of discretion
standard is used when a judge refuses to award attorney fees to a prevailing civil rights plaintiff
as when she grants a one-day continuance. Even a seemingly single issue, such as the motion for
new trial, may get different deference under “the” abuse of discretion standard depending on the
basis for new trial argued, or whether it was granted or denied.
224

1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 4.01[3] (footnotes omitted).
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explicitly addressed or offered much guidance on determining how much
deference is due once deferential review is granted to the individual issue.232
The critical aspect that requires appraisal is defining the range of discretion
in which a lower court could permissibly operate. Conducting one of the first
investigations of the topic, Professor Maurice Rosenberg viewed discretion as
capturing a concept of judicial “choice”—that is, the lower court’s “limited
right to be wrong” before a higher court on review will reverse the
decision233—and defined four general categories within the abuse of discretion
standard to help illustrate these degrees.234 Grade A discretion is “virtually
impervious to appellate overturn—it is unreviewable and unreversible [sic]”
because the trial court is given virtually unfettered authority; examples include
a trial court’s refusal to submit special verdicts to a jury or whether to order
pretrial conferences.235 At the other extreme, Grade D discretion is
significantly less deferential and much closer to de novo review than Grade A
discretion.236 Grades B and C discretion lie somewhere in between these two
extremes; both involve a balancing of the degree to which the judge’s
proximity to the factors informs her judgment237 and the degree of harm in a
“more than ‘ordinarily’ wrong” judicial decision.238
Later commentators deviated in conceptualizing and articulating how this
standard functioned. They viewed these degrees within appellate review of
discretion less categorically, instead seeing the process more as a continuum

232 But cf. id. (suggesting an application of the Pierce factors to guide the decision to apply the abuse of
discretion standard to the specific issue).
233 Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 175–76. Professor Rosenberg viewed discretion as having two
components. First, a court has discretion “when there are no fixed principles by which its correctness may be
determined” (primary or “decision-liberating” discretion). Id. at 175 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, “secondary,” or “review-limiting,” discretion considers discretion that involves the hierarchal
relationship between the trial and appellate court. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 636–43.
234 See Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 176–79.
235 Id. at 176–77.
236 See id. at 178–79. As an example of this type of discretion, Professor Rosenberg used a New York
appellate case where, although agreeing that a lower court’s decision to deny a motion for declaratory
judgment is within that court’s discretion, it had been abused here because “[i]f the ground on which the court
refuses to exercise discretion is untenable, the discretion has been improperly exercised.” See id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
237 “The trial judge often detects something in the course of the trial that leads him to exercise his power
as the ‘thirteenth juror.’ He may weigh the evidence differently from the jury, or see some other reason for
setting the verdict aside.” Id. at 177–78.
238 See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 652; see also Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 178 (describing an
appellate court’s reversal of a lower court’s decision not to grant a mistrial).
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with absolute deference and absolute appellate review as the poles,239 as a
structure allowing a shifting contextual meaning,240 or as being completely
separate from the trial court’s discretion in implementing a rule.241 Judge
Friendly framed the discussion as deciding when and where to apply a broader
or narrower interpretation of abuse of discretion.242 Broader applications would
afford expansive protection to a lower court’s decisions and allow limited
review by an appellate court, while narrower applications reverse this dynamic,
giving “a wide scope of appellate review” and limited protection to the district
court’s determinations.243 Alternatively, appellate courts could consider the
proper level of deference to a lower court’s discretion either by “fram[ing]
their review by issue, factors, reasoned analogy, and degree of discretion,”244
or by applying the Pierce factors, “not only to determine applicability[,] but
also to guide application of the flexible abuse test.”245
IV. IN DEFENSE OF DISCRETION: WHY A DETERMINATION OF EQUITABLE
MOOTNESS SHOULD BE JUDGED FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
This Comment has outlined a framework for determining which standard of
review is appropriate for an individual issue and noted some general guidelines
on how much deference a specific issue deserves when reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. This Part now addresses how these considerations interact with
the doctrine of equitable mootness. Determining a proper standard of review
for equitable mootness is especially difficult due to the doctrine’s construction
and the context of its review.246 While the majority test involves a balancing of
various factors on a case-by-case basis,247 both the first-level and second-level
appellate courts in bankruptcy appeals make their determinations based on a
substantially similar record.248 While the first-level appellate court is the first

239

See Friendly, supra note 22, at 762–73.
See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, §§ 4.01[3], 4.21.
241 Post, supra note 22, at 211–13.
242 Friendly, supra note 22, at 764.
243 Id. at 764 n.62.
244 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 4.01[3].
245 Id. Childress and Davis further suggest, “The strength or presence of such factors—including judicial
economy, position to judge, use of evidentiary facts, and practicality of generating a principle or rule—also
may weigh heavily in a court’s considered decision as to the strength and scope of review within an abuse of
discretion standard.” Id.
246 See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1335 (10th Cir. 2009).
247 See id. at 1338–39.
248 See FED. R. APP. P. 10(a)(1)–(2) (“The following items constitute the record on appeal: (1) the original
papers and exhibits filed in the district court; (2) the transcript of proceedings, if any . . . .”); 8 NORTON, supra
240
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possible court to hear the issue and the supporting evidence,249 the circuit court
of appeals—hearing the appeal of an appeal—normally applies de novo review
to the district court’s rulings.250 Thus, for any reason favoring one standard,
another seems to offer a countervailing consideration pushing for the other
standard. However, the context in which the doctrine arises, the doctrine’s
construction, and its underlying use in light of the relevant Supreme Court case
law all ultimately favor review under the abuse of discretion standard.
A. Determinations of Equitable Mootness Involve Evidence and Issues that
Are Considered for the First Time by the First-Level Appellate Court
For many issues in bankruptcy, the nonbankruptcy hierarchy of the federal
courts is significantly restructured.251 The district court, usually the trial court
in most federal suits,252 voluntarily vests the trial authority in a non-Article III
court253 and takes the status of an appellate court.254 This situation can be
problematic; the district court must then examine the bankruptcy court’s
findings for error rather than substituting its own, a contrast to its normal factfinding role. For instance, in Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C. A. Hughes & Co.,
the district court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s factual findings but,
drawing different inferences regarding a party’s intent to abandon property,
reversed the bankruptcy court.255 As intent is a matter of fact and not a

note 37, § 170:52, at 170-154 (appeals to the applicable court of appeals “are governed, not by the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, but rather the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure”).
249 See Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp. (In re Zenith Elecs. Corp.), 250 B.R. 207, 213–18 (D.
Del. 2000) (considering arguments and evidence regarding the plan’s substantial consummation, the
appellant’s efforts to obtain a stay, and the effects on third-party reliance), aff’d sub nom. Nordhoff Invs., Inc.
v. Zenith Elecs. Corp, 258 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2001).
250 See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1995) (“Our review of
the district court’s order is plenary because in bankruptcy cases the district court sits as an appellate court.”),
quoted in In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 568 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Alito, J., dissenting) (favoring
de novo review).
251 See Laura B. Bartell, The Appeal of Direct Appeal–Use of the New 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), 84 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 145, 146–55 (2010) (outlining the history and structure of, as well as problems created by, the
current bankruptcy appellate system).
252 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332 (2006), amended by Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act
of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, §§ 101–103, 125 Stat. 758, 758–59 (granting district courts original jurisdiction
over federal question and diversity suits).
253 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a); 1 COLLIER supra note 27, ¶ 3.01[1]. However, it is possible that, although
ceding authority to the bankruptcy courts in general, a district court reasserts its original jurisdiction and acts
as the trial court for the issue. See United States v. Schilling (In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp.), 355 F.3d 415, 427–
28 (6th Cir. 2004). Such exercises are then subject to the appropriate standard of review. Id. at 428–29.
254 28 U.S.C § 158(a).
255 Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C. A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 1981).
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conclusion of law,256 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district
court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the bankruptcy court absent a
demonstration that the original factual findings were clearly erroneous.257 As
an appellate court reviewing an appellate court, courts of appeals generally
have freer reign over interpreting the district court’s determinations in
bankruptcy than they would in the course of normal federal litigation.258
However, the doctrine of equitable mootness adds a further wrinkle to the
bankruptcy appellate process: as Judge Kennedy noted, it is perhaps the only
situation in which an “intermediate court will be deciding an equitable issue
for the first time and is the proper body to decide [it].”259 Equitable mootness is
a defense almost solely raised on appeal, frequently because it protects reliance
on a confirmed reorganization plan.260 Consequently, many evaluations of the
merits for or against granting an equitable mootness claim almost invariably
involve considerations and evidence being considered for the first time by the
appellate court.261 In this regard, when it is the first court to hear a claim of
equitable mootness,262 the first-level appellate court must frequently make
factual determinations on new evidence offered in attached affidavits and
statements and during oral argument.263 For instance, evidence that a plan has
been “substantially consummated” or fully implemented arises exclusively
from events occurring subsequent to a confirmed plan.264 The inclusion of such
evidence is authorized both by the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure265
256

Id. at 103–04.
Id. at 104–05.
258 See In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 568 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Alito, J., dissenting).
259 Curreys of Neb., Inc. v. United Producers, Inc. (In re United Producers, Inc.), 526 F.3d 942, 953 (6th
Cir. 2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
260 See, e.g., id. at 947 (“The equitable mootness doctrine is applied in appeals from bankruptcy
confirmations in order to protect parties relying upon the successful confirmation of a bankruptcy plan from a
drastic change after appeal.” (emphasis added)).
261 See Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp. (In re Zenith Elecs. Corp.), 250 B.R. 207, 213–18 (D.
Del. 2000) (considering evidence regarding the plan’s substantial consummation, the appellant’s efforts to
obtain a stay, and the effects on third-party reliance), aff’d sub nom. Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs.
Corp., 258 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2001). However, for other aspects, courts infer the reliance of third parties
through the use of evidence from either the plan as confirmed or in the record below. See In re Cont’l Airlines,
91 F.3d at 562–63.
262 It is of course possible for a claim of equitable mootness to be raised for the first time before a circuit
court. See Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584
F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009) (equitable mootness raised as defense on 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) direct appeal).
263 See, e.g., In re Zenith Elecs. Corp., 250 B.R. at 210–11, 213–18 & n.17.
264 See, e.g., Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp., 283 F.3d 622, 624–26 (4th Cir. 2002).
265 See FED. R. CIV. P. 43(c) (“When a motion relies on facts outside the record, the court may hear the
matter on affidavits or may hear it wholly or partly on oral testimony or on depositions.”), incorporated by
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9017. A nonmoving party can contest the information by offering counter-affidavits or
257
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and the reviewing courts of appeals,266 presumably recognizing that, unlike
other forms of litigation, the factual scenario in bankruptcy frequently
continues to develop as a case is being appealed.267 Thus, the two courts are
not in equivalent positions to consider an equitable mootness appeal, and it is
inaccurate for courts to claim that review de novo is appropriate for that
reason.268 Here, the second-level appellate court is not reviewing the merits of
the appeal, but rather the lower court’s original judgment and factual findings.
B. The Doctrine Is Fact-Intensive and Requires Case-by-Case Analysis of the
Relevant Factors, Both of Which Favor Review for Abuse of Discretion
Another factor favoring deferential review is the precise implementation of
the equitable mootness test itself. When the individual factual circumstances
involved in resolving a specific issue are “multifarious, fleeting, special,
narrow facts that utterly resist generalization,”269 the Supreme Court has stated
that discretion is warranted to give courts time to create guiding principles and
rules.270 Additionally, determinations that are “fact-intensive, close calls”
might deserve some deference because, being so particularized to the
individual situation, they “cannot be made uniform through appellate review,
de novo or otherwise.”271
In the context of equitable mootness determinations, some of these
concerns are admittedly absent. Here, years of experimenting with the

attacking “the legal sufficiency and effect of the evidence.” Huddleston v. Nelson Bunker Hunt Trust Estate,
102 B.R. 71, 74–75 (N.D. Tex. 1989).
266 See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1335 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[C]ourts
generally agree that a court of appeals reviews a district court’s factual findings relating to a determination of
equitable mootness for clear error . . . .”); Liquidity Solutions, Inc. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (In re WinnDixie Store, Inc.), 286 F. App’x 619, 622–25 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (upholding a district court’s
factual finding regarding the plan’s substantial consummation even while addressing the general rule that a
district court is not allowed to make independent factual findings in reviewing a bankruptcy court’s decision).
267 See Frankfurth v. Cummins (In re Cummins), 20 B.R. 652, 653 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (“Ordinarily an
appellate court should base its decision on the facts as they existed at the time the trial court made its decision.
However, the on-going nature of bankruptcy proceedings, on occasion, creates situations where the reviewing
court may take notice of fundamental events occurring after the entry of the judgment from which appeal was
taken.”).
268 See, e.g., Curreys of Neb., Inc. v. United Producers, Inc. (In re United Producers, Inc.), 526 F.3d 942,
946–47 (6th Cir. 2008).
269 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561–62 (1987) (quoting Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 662–63)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
270 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990); Pierce, 487 U.S. at 561–63.
271 See Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 404–05 (quoting Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Bank N.A., 880 F.2d 928,
936 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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doctrine272 have allowed for the formation of factor-based tests that encompass
the aspects that courts most frequently consider when applying the doctrine.273
In this way, the facts usually most pertinent to the discussion do not “utterly
resist generalization.”274 However, simply because the doctrine has been
formalized to a degree does not automatically subject it to de novo review; for
instance, despite the eventual development of guiding principles, other
equitable doctrines still receive deferential review.275 Therefore, the doctrine
should be considered in light of whether independent review would aid in the
uniform application of the law or if, as a matter of course, the facts would be
too particularized for full review to guarantee uniformity.276
Part of this question is answered by the endless variety of situations which
the courts must consider when applying the test. The manner and method of
the relief the appellant requests weigh significantly on any given evaluation of
equitable mootness.277 In the easy case, the relief sought requires the complete
or substantial dissolution of a plan.278 In such situations, the courts have found
no difficulty in using equitable mootness to squelch the appeal.279 However,
chapter 11 reorganizations, while requiring that a proposed plan meet the
technical requirements of either § 1129(a) or § 1129(b),280 can represent a
diverse range of interests that sometimes require or allow differing
treatment.281 As the reasons that parties appeal the confirmation of

272

Some of the earliest threads of the doctrine can be seen in cases going back as far as the early 1980s.
See In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1146–50 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (articulating how “common sense or
equitable considerations” might moot appeals from a mostly completed plan even when relief could be
granted), vacated in part on other grounds, 797 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Trone v. Roberts Farms,
Inc. (In re Roberts Farms), 652 F.2d 793, 798 (9th Cir. 1981) (refusing to reverse a mostly completed plan
when the appellants’ failure to obtain a stay resulted in a substantial change in circumstances).
273 See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1338–39 (10th Cir. 2009).
274 Pierce, 487 U.S. at 562 (quoting Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 662–63) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
275 The equitable doctrine of excusable neglect, to provide an illustrating example, is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 6.06[3][b] (3d ed. 2011).
276 See Cooter & Gill, 496 U.S. at 404–05.
277 See Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.),
416 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2005); see also White & Medford, supra 103, at 26, 27.
278 Manges v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1042–43 (5th Cir. 1994) (“We must
evaluate these transfers, many of which appear irreversible, against the backdrop of the relief sought—nothing
less than a wholesale annihilation of the [p]lan.”).
279 See Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 189–90 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying relief
when the appellant’s challenge went to “the very centerpiece of the plan”).
280 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)–(b) (2006).
281 See generally 7 COLLIER supra note 27, ¶ 1122.03 (discussing the classification of the varying range of
claims or interests in a chapter 11 plan).
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reorganization plans can vary greatly,282 and the types of relief requested range
extensively in type and effect,283 the requested relief in the appeal must be
tested individually against the interest of the other parties or the success of the
plan.284 For instance, an appeal seeking millions of dollars might be completely
infeasible without gutting a reorganized debtor in one case,285 while in another
granting the same relief would not destroy the reorganization due to the size of
the debtor.286
Therefore, courts frequently note that equitable mootness evaluations
require individualized consideration. The court must consider “the totality of
its circumstances[,]”287 and the evaluations do not lend themselves to
“inflexible, formalistic rules.”288 This individualized evaluation results in at
least three practical consequences. First, the various factors forming the test are
“given varying weight, depending on the particular circumstances.”289 Even
though certain factors such as substantial consummation or a failure to get or
seek a stay are frequently given considerable weight,290 the fulfillment of either

282

See supra text accompanying notes 55–61.
Compare United States v. GWI PCS 1, Inc., 245 B.R. 59, 64 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (factor regarding third
party interests and success of plan favored equitable mootness when granting appellant’s claims would result
in $900 million liability for emerging debtor), aff’d, sub nom. United States ex rel. FCC v. GWI PCS 1, Inc.
(In re GWI PCS 1, Inc.), 230 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000), with Schaefer v. Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. (In re
Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc.), 591 F.3d 350, 353–54 (5th Cir. 2009) (reversing a confirmed plan does make a
plan equitably moot when granting the requested relief—increased disclosures and specificity—would not
completely undo plan), and Guardian Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Arbors of Houston Assocs. Ltd. P’ship (In re
Arbors of Houston Assocs. Ltd. P’ship), No. 97-2099, 1999 WL 17649, at *2–3 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 1999)
(holding the requested relief was not equitably moot when appellant did not challenge the plan, but rather only
an interpretation of one section of the plan).
284 In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“In exercising its discretionary power to
dismiss an appeal on mootness grounds, a court cannot avoid its obligation to scrutinize each individual claim,
testing the feasibility of granting the relief against its potential impact on the reorganization scheme as a
whole.”), vacated in part on other grounds, 797 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
285 In re Machne Menachem, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-0057, 2008 WL 906476, at *4–6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31,
2008) (noting that a successful appeal would require the return of the $1 million offered in consideration for
releases, inhibiting the ability of the reorganized debtor to pay its debts and thus gutting the reorganization
plan).
286 LTV Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 167 B.R. 776, 779 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“It
is difficult to conceive how a potential liability of, at most, several million dollars could unravel the [d]ebtors’
reorganization, which involved the transfer of billions of dollars, and which has resulted in the revival of
[d]ebtors into a multi-billion dollar operation with $200 million in working capital.”).
287 Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp., 283 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002).
288 See In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d at 1147–48.
289 See, e.g., In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 560 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
290 See, e.g., id. (identifying the “foremost consideration” in an equitable mootness claim to be “whether
the reorganization plan has been substantially consummated”).
283
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factor is not dispositive.291 Second, even factors that are usually less factintensive and easily determined, such as the failure to pursue or receive a
stay,292 do not in the “totality of circumstances” always cut clearly for or
against a determination of equitable mootness.293 Third, although most courts
have articulated the factors most pertinent to an evaluation of equitable
mootness, they rarely state that these factors are the only considerations that
must be evaluated.294 Therefore, a court should not be restricted from
considering additional relevant facts and factors, even when not formally
encoded in the circuit’s test, if doing so would allow full consideration of the
individual case.295 However, allowing a lower court this flexibility to consider
outside factors limits the ability of the reviewing court to state authoritatively
that a given factor is impermissible or permissible generally; for instance, an
outside factor considered useful in one case might be irrelevant in another.296
Such individualized analysis in granting equitable mootness therefore raises
two reasons reviewing courts grant deference to a lower court’s judgment. The
fact that the lower court is required to conduct a case-by-case review means
that the lower court must be invested with some level of “choice” in weighing
the individual factors; this choice, in many commentators’ minds, is a classic

291 See Manges v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1042–43 (5th Cir. 1994) (“As
several courts have made clear, [s]ubstantial consummation . . . is a momentous event, but it does not
necessarily make it impossible or inequitable for an appellate court to grant effective relief.”) (first alteration in
original) (quoting Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 952 (2d Cir. 1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted); Rochman v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Grp. (In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H.), 963 F.2d
469, 473 (1st Cir. 1992) (“The failure to obtain a stay is not sufficient ground for a finding of mootness.”).
292 See, e.g., Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network,
Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 144–45 (2d Cir. 2005).
293 See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1340–42 (10th Cir. 2009);
Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180, 186–88 (3d Cir. 2001).
294 See Alta. Energy Partners v. Blast Energy Servs., Inc. (In re Blast Energy Servs., Inc.), 593 F.3d 418,
424 n.4 (5th Cir. 2010) (stating that, although the factor test is useful, other principles of equity might be
relevant to the individual determination); Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp., 283 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002)
(noting that the doctrine “does not employ rigid rules,” and its use “include[s]” the majority test’s factors, not
that such factors are the only considerations). But see Curreys of Neb., Inc. v. United Producers, Inc. (In re
United Producers, Inc.), 526 F.3d 942, 947–48 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) (refusing to consider a factor not already in
the circuit’s rule).
295 See In re Manges, 29 F.3d at 1043 (considering the fact that the relief requested would not benefit the
appellants and the financial investment made by the appellee relevant to their determination).
296 See id. (considering the fact that the required relief would likely not benefit the appellants as relevant
in that specific determination). However, some outside factors might never be relevant. In these cases, the
reviewing court should correct this abuse of discretion. See Noonan v. Cunard S.S. Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 (2d
Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.) (noting that deference is not appropriate, even in areas usually mandating it, when the
question is amenable to a simple “yes-or-no answer applicable to all cases”).
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sign of invested discretion.297 Additionally, deferential review is appropriate
since one of the principal justifications for de novo review—guaranteeing the
consistent application of the law298—is not furthered in cases where the
underlying analysis and factual concerns are inevitably individualized.299
C. Equitable Doctrines Like Equitable Mootness Are Usually Deferentially
Reviewed
There is one last aspect to the doctrine that favors deferential review.
Although the precise form of the test varies from circuit to circuit, all versions
of the equitable mootness test evaluate factors focused on similar underlying
issues.300 These shared concerns center on two general questions. If the appeal
is not constitutionally moot,301 would granting effective relief to the appellant
be unfair to third party interests who acted in reliance on the plan’s
confirmation?302 Moreover, would granting the desired relief wholly
undermine the plan and reemergence of the debtor as a viable business?303
These two concerns correlate strongly with the competing policy concerns
underlying equitable mootness: balancing the particular need for finality in
bankruptcy with the right of the aggrieved party to meaningful appeal.304
The individual equitable mootness factors directly reflect the competing
interests at stake. For instance, if a plan is substantially consummated, it can
become much more difficult to unwind transactions without directly interfering

297 See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 636–37 (“If the word discretion conveys to legal minds any solid
core of meaning, one central idea above all others, it is the idea of choice.”).
298 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 585 (1987) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
299 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404–05 (1990).
300 Compare Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1339 (10th Cir. 2009), and
In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 560 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), and United States v. GWI PCS 1 Inc. (In re
GWI PCS 1 Inc.), 230 F.3d 788, 800 (5th Cir. 2000), with Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay
Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 952–53 (2d Cir. 1993), and In re Specialty Equip. Cos., 3 F.3d 1043, 1048 (7th Cir.
1993).
301 Rochman v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Grp. (In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H.), 963 F.2d 469, 471 & n.4 (1st Cir.
1992) (addressing the “jurisdictional” aspects of bankruptcy mootness evaluations).
302 See, e.g., Wooley v. Faulkner (In re SI Restructuring, Inc.), 542 F.3d 131, 135–36 (5th Cir. 2008)
(“The concept of [equitable] mootness from a prudential standpoint protects the interest[s] of non-adverse third
parties who are not before the reviewing court but who have acted in reliance upon the plan as implemented.
The ultimate question to be decided is whether the Court can grant relief without undermining the plan and,
thereby, affecting third parties.” (first alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Manges v. Seattle-First
Nat’l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
303 See, e.g., In re GWI PCS 1 Inc., 230 F.3d at 802–03.
304 First Union Real Estate Equity & Mortg. Invs. v. Club Assocs. (In re Club Assocs.), 956 F.2d 1065,
1069 (11th Cir. 1992).
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with the plan’s viability.305 Similarly, seeking a stay strives to prevent
precisely those third party reliance interests that courts must protect in
bankruptcy.306 Therefore, the factors are best viewed, as some courts have
noted, as a means of balancing the underlying equities: the plan proponents and
third party interests on one side, the appellants on the other.307 Indeed, every
circuit has noted the underlying equitable nature of the doctrine in the course
of addressing or using the doctrine.308 Courts review equitable doctrines
deferentially to allow for the necessary “breadth and flexibility” to fashion a
proper remedy.309 As a doctrine fundamentally rooted in equity and
fundamentally tied to remedial concerns,310 equitable mootness should thus be
reviewed for abuse of discretion.
V. “GIVE THEM ONLY ENOUGH ROPE TO HANG THEMSELVES”: SECONDLEVEL APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD EXTEND ONLY LIMITED DEFERENCE TO A
FIRST-LEVEL COURT’S EQUITABLE MOOTNESS DETERMINATION
While determinations of equitable mootness should be reviewed for an
abuse of discretion, that does not end the present inquiry. Recognition that
deference to a lower court’s evaluation is either preferable or necessary rarely
acts as a blank check to the lower court to rule as it wishes.311 Instead, the
specific deference granted by the abuse of discretion standard can vary greatly

305

See, e.g., Retired Pilots Ass’n of US Airways, Inc. v. US Airways Grp., Inc. (In re US Airways Grp.,
Inc.), 369 F.3d 806, 810 (4th Cir. 2004) (consummation of the plan gave the debtor a needed $1.24 billion in
financing and investments).
306 Frito-Lay, Inc. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 10 F.3d 944, 953 (2d Cir. 1993)
(considering the failure to seek a stay important because absent such stay, the irreversible transactions under
the plan can occur unhindered). Contra In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769–70 (7th Cir. 1994) (merely
seeking a stay is irrelevant because “[a] stay not sought, and a stay sought and denied, lead equally to the
implementation of the plan”).
307 See United Artists Theatre Co. v. Walton (In re United Artists Theatre Co.), 315 F.3d 217, 228 (3d Cir.
2003) (noting that the court in making an equitable mootness determination “must balance the equities of both
positions and determine whether it is prudent to upset the [p]lan at this date” (emphasis added)).
308 See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1337–38 (10th Cir. 2009) (listing
cases from every other circuit that adopted the doctrine when considering whether “equitable, prudential, or
pragmatic considerations can render an appeal of a bankruptcy court decision moot even when the appeal is
not constitutionally moot”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
309 See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 4.16.
310 See, e.g., Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp., 283 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002).
311 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that there are limitations to an exercise of the discretion
granted to any specific doctrine: “[A] motion to [a court’s] discretion is a motion, not to its inclination, but to
its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546
U.S. 132, 139 (2005) (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D.
Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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depending on the specific context, the doctrine being applied, and different
answers to the same question.312 Thus, to evaluate the problem fully, this
Comment also considers what it means to be an abuse of discretion in an
equitable mootness case.313 While such questions are inevitably murky and the
definite boundaries between types of discretion are indeterminable,314 even a
broad determination of the approximate deference aids potential appellants in
determining whether to appeal a first-level appellate court’s judgment on
equitable mootness.315
Although this Comment has shown that the abuse of discretion standard is
preferable for reviews of equitable mootness,316 considering “how much”
deference is due is a separate inquiry317 and thus requires a separate
examination. This analysis relies on a framework suggested by Professors
Steven Childress and Martha Davis and uses the Pierce factors to evaluate “the
strength and scope of review within” the abuse of discretion standard.318 It also
considers Cooter & Gell and Koon and the ways those decisions have affected
the Pierce factors. Applying these factors below, this Comment will
demonstrate that there are good doctrinal and policy-based reasons for a
second-level appellate court to apply a less deferential form of the abuse of
discretion standard to equitable mootness determinations.
A. Similar Reliance on the Underlying Trial Record Developed by the
Bankruptcy Court Mitigates Against a Broader Grant of Deference
As noted by courts and commentators alike, one of the strongest grounds
for granting considerable deference to the district court in certain instances has
been dubbed the “you are there” explanation.319 In this exposition, the trial
judge has supervised the trial from the start, observed the development of the
evidence and the interactions between the parties, and can therefore best
312 See, e.g., 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 275, ¶ 11.28[4][b] (discussing the common practice of reviewing
grants of Rule 11 sanctions more stringently than denials).
313 See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 4.01[3].
314 See id. § 4.21.
315 See Storm, supra note 121, at 76 (reviewing a law consistently allows an appellant to “assess his or her
own situation in light of similar situations decided by courts . . . to better gauge [their] likely success . . . if
[they are] subjected to the same judicial decision-making process in a lawsuit”).
316 See supra Part IV.
317 Post, supra note 22, at 213 (“[T]rial court discretion arising from the absence of appellate review is a
gradient that exists in varying degrees.”).
318 See 1 CHILDRESS & DAVIS, supra note 19, § 4.01[3].
319 See Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 182–84 (1978); see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559–
61 (1987).
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ascertain the credibility of witnesses.320 For these reasons, the extensive
familiarity of the lower court with the individual case might give “the district
court . . . insights not conveyed by the record”321 and make it the judicial actor
better positioned “as a matter of the sound administration of justice”322 to rule
on the specific issue given the context of the trial.323
Because an evaluation of whether a claim is equitably moot normally
requires evidence demonstrating the substantial consummation of the
reorganization plan,324 the reviewing appellate court will have to consider
information that was not before the bankruptcy court.325 However, other
factors rely much more heavily on elements from the factual record prepared
by the bankruptcy court. Courts at both levels of the bankruptcy appellate
process frequently make use of the underlying factual record to make
predictions about the effect of the plan on third parties or on the debtor’s
ability to reorganize.326 For example, in weighing these factors, it is not
unusual for the first-level appellate court to rely not only on the affidavits and
assertions made in oral arguments but also on the terms of the confirmed plan
and the underlying record of the appeal.327 In such situations, the second-level
appellate court owes little deference to the first-level appellate court’s
interpretation of the underlying record prior to the first appeal. This is because
320

Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 663–64.
Pierce, 487 U.S. at 560.
322 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985), quoted in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
403 (1990).
323 For instance, where a law awarded attorney’s fees “unless the court finds that the position . . . was
substantially justified,” the Court believed that the trial court was better positioned due to their familiarity with
the case even though the issue was solely an evaluation of legal issues. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559–61
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
324 See, e.g., Ins. Subrogation Claimants v. U.S. Brass Corp. (In re U.S. Brass Corp.), 169 F.3d 957, 960–
61 (5th Cir. 1999) (reviewing court of appeals considering new evidence postconfirmation); United States v.
GWI PCS 1 Inc., 245 B.R. 59, 62–64 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (reviewing district court considered evidence that arose
postconfirmation), aff’d sub nom. United States ex rel. FCC v. GWI PCS 1, Inc. (In re GWI PCS 1, Inc.), 230
F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2000).
325 See Manges v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1041 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that
appellate courts are allowed to make factual determinations of events that have occurred since confirmation).
But see Liquidity Solutions, Inc. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (In re Winn-Dixie Store, Inc.), 286 F. App’x 619,
624 n.3 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (implying that considering new evidence as an appellate court would be
improper if the evidence had been challenged).
326 See Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc.),
416 F.3d 136, 144–45 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that, though there were insufficient findings of fact to rule on the
other parts of the appeal, there was enough to determine that the challenged settlement was a “critical
component of the [p]lan” that could not be undone “without violence to the overall arrangements”).
327 See Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp. (In re Zenith Elecs. Corp.), 250 B.R. 207, 216–19 (D.
Del. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Nordhoff Invs., Inc. v. Zenith Elecs. Corp., 258 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2001).
321
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both courts approach this evidence in comparable ways as appellate bodies,
examining and applying the same standards of review to a record developed by
the bankruptcy court.328
B. Development of a Broadly Applicable Rule and the Underlying Legal or
Easily Determinable Factual Components Favor Less Deferential Review
The other strong reason for granting considerable deference to a lower
court specifically addresses the reviewing court’s ability to articulate general
guiding principles at that point.329 The Supreme Court explicitly agreed with
this characterization in such situations where the broad range of factual
scenarios and the relatively sparse case law regarding its use prevented
articulation of the key guiding principles at that time.330 In such situations, the
Court reasoned that requiring more deferential review would allow courts to
develop these principles better below before they would be applied universally
from above.331 However, subsequent Court decisions and commentators have
subjected such deferential reviews to significant caveats. In situations where
the lower court has predicated its discretionary decision on a clearly erroneous
view of the evidence or an error of law, it has committed an abuse of
discretion.332 Additionally, extreme deference is only due to a lower court’s
determination when there are no clear standards governing the situation.333
Once such a principle has been articulated, however, the reviewing court can
and likely should exercise greater review powers over these discretionary
actions to ensure that those principles are followed.334
Many of these concerns are less operative in the context of equitable
mootness. Unlike the situation described in Pierce, where the number of
possible situations had yet to give way to guiding principles and extreme
flexibility was therefore a boon,335 the adoption of equitable mootness has two
328 See Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C. A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101–02 (3d Cir. 1981) (allowing
freer review of a first-level appellate court’s factual analysis since the lower court was acting as an appellate
body).
329 Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 181–82.
330 See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 561–62 (1987) (citing Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 662–63).
331 See id. at 562.
332 See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (citation omitted) (explaining that making an error
of law is an abuse of discretion), superseded in part by statute, Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650; Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 400–01 (1990) (noting that clearly erroneous factual findings are an abuse of discretion).
333 See Friendly, supra note 22, at 775–77.
334 See id.
335 See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 562.
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accompanying aspects that bear discussion here. First, the adoption of
equitable mootness at the circuit level is almost always accompanied by an
explication of the factors that a court should consider in making this
determination.336 Second, the courts also describe the standard against which
the lower court must evaluate the individual facts in granting or denying
equitable mootness.337 Both of these two constraints limit, where they do not
altogether eliminate, the amount of discretion any lower court can truly use.338
Thus, the reviewing court should verify that the lower court has considered the
issue stringently enough to have discharged its duties satisfactorily.339
Furthermore, although the doctrine involves “a discretionary balancing of
equitable and prudential factors,”340 this is an incomplete characterization of
the doctrine as several of the important factors have legal or easily
ascertainable factual measurements. Specifically, two of the four factors most
frequently considered in equitable mootness determinations are whether the
plan has been substantially consummated and whether and to what degree the
appealing party sought a stay.341 “Substantial consummation,” although
adopted as an equitable barometer in addressing equitable mootness,342 is a
legal standard defined in the Code343 with significance outside of the
doctrine.344 Since a lower court necessarily abuses its discretion if it commits

336

See, e.g., In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 560 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (outlining the factors
considered by courts in making a determination of equitable mootness). The courts of appeals are not in
agreement, however, if these factors fully encapsulate all possible concerns. Compare Curreys of Neb., Inc. v.
United Producers, Inc. (In re United Producers, Inc.), 526 F.3d 942, 947–48 & n.2 (6th Cir. 2008) (refusing to
consider a fourth factor), with Manges v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1043 (5th Cir.
1994) (considering other factors relevant in addition to those within the equitable mootness doctrine).
337 See, e.g., Retired Pilots Ass’n of US Airways, Inc. v. US Airways Grp., Inc. (In re US Airways Grp.,
Inc.), 369 F.3d 806, 809 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting an appeal is “equitably moot when it becomes impractical and
imprudent to upset the plan of reorganization at this late date” (quoting Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp., 283
F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
338 See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 658–60.
339 See Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584
F.3d 229, 244 n.19 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that “[e]quitable mootness should protect legitimate expectations of
parties to bankruptcy cases but should not be a shield for sharp or unauthorized practices”).
340 In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d at 560.
341 Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1339 (10th Cir. 2009).
342 See Curreys of Neb., Inc. v. United Producers, Inc. (In re United Producers, Inc.), 526 F.3d 942, 948
(6th Cir. 2008) (“If a plan has been substantially consummated there is a greater likelihood that overturning the
confirmation plan will have adverse effects on the success of the plan and on third parties.”).
343 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) (2006).
344 See 7 COLLIER, supra note 27, ¶ 1101.02 (addressing uses of the concept of substantial consummation
explicitly in the Code and in bankruptcy generally).
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an error of law,345 the reviewing court should not hesitate to perform its
appellate duties to maintain a uniform definition regarding this legal standard.
Additionally, it is generally fairly easy to determine which party is favored by
the factor inquiring whether a stay pending appeal of the confirmed plan was
either received or at least sought at each stage of the litigation.346 Even the
more complex situations involving this factor are not generally so factually
nuanced or complex as to place the reviewing court at too great a disadvantage
in evaluating this factor.347 Thus, although the ultimate question irrefutably
deals with inherently prudential or equitable concerns,348 second-level
appellate courts are not terribly disadvantaged in reviewing certain aspects of
an equitable mootness determination.
C. Significant Risk to Appellant’s Interests Arising from an Erroneous
Decision Favors a More Thorough Review of the First-Level Appellate
Court’s Grant of Equitable Mootness
The final aspect significantly favoring less deferential review arises from
the risks to either party in the situation of an erroneous determination below.
On this front, the situation in Pierce provides useful guidance.349 There, the
Court noted that the “substantial amount of the liability created by the [d]istrict
[j]udge’s decision” favored de novo review.350 However, noting that this was
not the norm and the risks to an adversely affected party were normally much
more reasonable, the Court applied the more deferential standard because
“generality rather than the exception must form the basis for [the] rule.”351
In cases involving equitable mootness determinations, the risks and
potential liability are not uniformly definable due to the wide-ranging interests
and potential remedies that exist within a chapter 11 plan.352 However, the
potential financial liability at play in the average chapter 11 case is frequently
345 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996), superseded in part by statute, Prosecutorial Remedies
and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650.
346 See Manges v. Seattle-First Nat’l Bank (In re Manges), 29 F.3d 1034, 1039 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[I]n
many of the cases in which bankruptcy appeals were dismissed as [equitably] moot, the appellants failed to
seek a stay.”).
347 See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1341 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that
the instant case presented “a sort of middle ground”: although the appellants sought a stay from the bankruptcy
court and district court, they did not appeal the stay’s denial, nor did they seek mandamus relief).
348 See, e.g., id. at 1337–38.
349 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 563 (1987).
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 See supra text accompanying notes 55–61 & 277–86.
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much higher than that in Pierce.353 Additionally, an overzealous application of
the equitable mootness doctrine can result in a first-level appellate court
depriving an appellant of the right to have her appeal heard on the merits, even
in situations where meaningful and equitable relief could still be granted.354
Given the importance of allowing meritorious appeals in the American system
of justice,355 as well as the significant time lags between when an appeal is
filed in the lower courts and when it is heard on appeal at both levels that
increase the likelihood of substantial consummation of the plan,356 a secondlevel appellate court should not be allowed to rely solely on deference to a
lower court to avoid its “judicial duty to examine carefully each request for
relief.”357 By giving the first-level appellate court some discretion, but not
abdicating their review duties completely, reviewing courts can ensure that the
application of the equitable mootness doctrine is “limited in scope and
cautiously applied.”358
VI. PROPOSALS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THIS STANDARD
This Comment has argued that the universal adoption of an abuse of
discretion standard that does not fully defer to the first-level appellate court’s
determination would appropriately balance the competing needs for finality
and the right to a meaningful appeal. Many of the actions necessary to properly
implement this standard could be easily and painlessly done. When exercising
its discretion, the first-level appellate court should be required to describe in
sufficient detail its reasons for its determination of equitable mootness. This
353 Compare Retired Pilots Ass’n of US Airways, Inc. v. US Airways Grp., Inc. (In re US Airways Grp.,
Inc.), 369 F.3d 806, 810–11 (4th Cir. 2004) (reinstating debtor’s liability for pension plan eliminated via
“distress termination” would directly and substantially interfere with confirmed plan and debtor’s chances of
reorganization), and United States v. GWI PCS 1 Inc. (In re GWI PCS 1 Inc.), 230 F.3d 788, 792–95 (5th Cir.
2000) (appellant sought to reinstate a debt of almost $900 million for the sale of an asset sold at $1.06 billion,
but presently worth $166 million), with Pierce, 487 U.S. at 563 (median cost of attorney’s fee award against
government less than $3,000).
354 See Alta. Energy Partners v. Blast Energy Servs., Inc. (In re Blast Energy Servs., Inc.), 593 F.3d 418,
425–26 (5th Cir. 2010) (remanding an equitable mootness determination because the district court had not
adequately demonstrated, and the record did not support, that the relief requested would interfere with either
the plan or the rights of third parties).
355 See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 641–42.
356 See In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 768–69 (7th Cir. 1994) (describing how several years passed
between plan confirmation and resolution of the appeals before the district court and, as a result, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit heard the case three years after confirmation).
357 In re AOV Indus., 792 F.2d 1140, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (refusing to find an appeal moot
automatically because the plan had been substantially consummated), vacated in part on other grounds, 797
F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
358 In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 559 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
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analysis would allow the appellate court to better evaluate that
determination.359 Additionally, the lower court should only invoke equitable
mootness to deny an evaluation on the merits of a specific claim and not to
dismiss an entire appeal.360 If and only if the lower court has taken both of
these steps and exercised its discretion soundly in weighing the specific facts
and factors in the instant case, the second-level appellate court should be more
hesitant to reverse the lower court. If the lower court did not justify its position
adequately or fundamentally misapplied the doctrine of equitable mootness,
the reviewing court should not hesitate either to review the issue itself361 or,
though less preferable, remand it back to the lower court.362
In these ways, the lighter abuse of discretion standard adopted by the Tenth
Circuit in In re Paige impressively balances these competing demands.
Throughout its analysis, the court paid considerable attention to the claims and
facts at hand and outlined in considerable detail its reasons for reaching its
final conclusion.363 Although refusing to give deference to the lower court’s
determinations when the lower court impermissibly shifted the burden for a
specific factor,364 the court’s standard demonstrates a tacit recognition of both
the desirability of finality in bankruptcy and of the fact-specific nature of the
underlying examination. This fine line allows a reviewing court to discharge its
appellate duties by ensuring that the lower court’s discretion was “guided by
sound legal principles.”365 However, it also ensures that, when the lower court
has considered the issue thoroughly, individuals can attach greater finality to
the opinion.366
A simple procedural change would further buttress the viability of this
standard. Equitable mootness determinations by a first-level appellate court
359

See Rosenberg, supra note 22, at 665–66.
In the words of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, appellate courts should “apply equitable mootness
with a scalpel rather than an axe.” See Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., NA v. Official Unsecured Creditors’ Comm.
(In re Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 240–53 (5th Cir. 2009) (finding only two of the eight alleged issues
actually equitably moot on direct appeal).
361 See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1338–49 (10th Cir. 2009).
362 See Alta. Energy Partners v. Blast Energy Servs., Inc. (In re Blast Energy Servs., Inc.), 593 F.3d 418,
424–26, 428 (5th Cir. 2010) (remanding when the lower court did not fully explain how a determination on the
merits would interfere with the rights of third parties).
363 See In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1340–49. Compare this to the rather cursory treatment that the lower court
gave some of the analysis. See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re Paige), No. 2:07-CV-822 TS, 2008
WL 2064628, at *5–7 (D. Utah May 13, 2008).
364 See In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1333–34.
365 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (Marshall, C.J.).
366 See Sutton v. Weinman (In re Centrix Fin., LLC), 394 F. App’x 485 (10th Cir. 2010) (upholding a
dismissal for equitable mootness when the lower court had considered the issue stringently).
360
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necessitate the consideration of factual developments between the confirmation
of the plan and the appeal itself when a stay is not granted.367 It also involves
arguments about the individual reliance interests of parties in the confirmation
of the plan, as well as the effect of undoing the plan, which might not have
been adequately addressed in the bankruptcy court’s record. Thus, the secondlevel appellate court’s ability to consider the issue might be so unduly limited
as to require remanding the issue when the facts on postconfirmation matters
are disputed368 or when the original record is spotty.369 This is not favorable
from any perspective, as it leads to one of two equally poor results. It draws
out the bankruptcy appellate process further than necessary when the factual
determinations are limited in scope, significantly undercutting the desired
finality. Alternatively, such a cramped capacity undercuts the viability of an
abuse of discretion standard by limiting the weight that a second-level
appellate court can reasonably attribute to the necessary determinations by the
first-level appellate court.
An explicit procedural rule allowing a first-level appellate court the right to
engage in more extensive fact-finding that is limited solely to evaluating fully
the changed circumstances following confirmation solves these issues. It
would allow the first-level appellate courts the leeway to determine more
accurately a claim of equitable mootness and would bolster the ability of the
second-level appellate courts to give deference to the lower court’s
independent determinations without unduly extending the process.370
CONCLUSION
There are a host of reasons why circuits should review equitable mootness
determinations by a first-level appellate court for an abuse of discretion.
367

The benefit of a stay pending appeal is that it affords the appellant “the opportunity . . . to hold things
in stasis, to prevent reliance on the plan of reorganization while the appeal proceeds.” In re UNR Indus., Inc.,
20 F.3d 766, 769–70 (7th Cir. 1994). Thus, since the stay prevents the plan from being substantially
consummated or from being relied upon by third parties, a court granting a stay severely limits the chances that
the appeal will be found equitably moot. In re Paige, 584 F.3d at 1340–41.
368 See Huddleston v. Nelson Bunker Hunt Trust Estate, 102 B.R. 71, 76–77 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (remanding
when facts critical to determining mootness were in dispute).
369 See In re Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 29 F.3d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that, if deciding the issue of
equitable mootness were dispositive, the court would be forced to remand since the record did not allow the
court to determine “whether modification of the plan of reorganization would bear unduly on the innocent”).
370 Cf. In re Cont’l Airlines, 91 F.3d 553, 568 n.4 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the general structure of bankruptcy appeals would favor de novo review since the court of appeals is “in
just as good a position to make this determination as was the district court, which sat as an appellate court in
this case”).
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Doctrinally, deferential review of equitable mootness follows from the factintensive and individualized nature of the evaluation. This standard would
likewise account for the continued development of the issues during the appeal
and maintain continuity with the deferential review that other equitable,
prudential, and discretionary remedies receive. From a policy perspective,
implementing this standard supports the focus in bankruptcy cases on finality
by limiting spurious appeals and minimizing the chances that the reviewing
court will overturn a confirmed plan on appeal.
However, resolving which standard of review the courts should follow is
not the end of the examination. After one determines that a doctrine merits
deferential review, one must also figure out the degree of deference that the
individual question deserves. For equitable mootness, the discretion of the
lower courts is and should be limited for several reasons. The declaration of
broader rules and general principles by every circuit demonstrates the intent by
the reviewing courts to focus the analysis along specific, if not necessarily
rigid, lines. The shared reliance on large portions of the underlying factual
record as well as the significant risks to the appellant’s financial and legal
interests also cut in favor of a more exacting review.
Thus, while finality might deserve systemic protection on appeal, it should
not operate as a carte blanche to justify a lower court’s whims or to allow it to
shirk its duties to examine each case scrupulously. By adopting a less
deferential abuse of discretion test, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis in In re Paige
showed a tacit understanding of these competing needs by conditioning its
deference in reviews of equitable mootness on a thorough and sound
consideration of the issue below rather than merely as a matter of course. Since
this position appropriately balances the underlying tensions in bankruptcy
appeals—that is, the need for finality and the need for meaningful review—
courts of appeals should adopt this standard when reviewing equitable
mootness.
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